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ABSTRACT
The technological advancements have made smartphones an indispensable component
of our daily lives. Security and privacy (S&P) on smartphones has thus become an important
research topic. Since there are no universally applicable solutions to solve S&P issues on
smartphones, we conduct our research in a case study manner, with a focus on smartphone
sensors. We propose Spy-Phone to show how smartphones get eavesdropped by motion
sensors, Ultra-Unlock to authenticate users with gestures in the air, and MoVo to protect
voice authentication systems against spoofing attacks.
In detail, the Spy-Phone system turns smartphones into spy bugs by performing Man-in-
the-Phone attack. Such an attack is based on the fact that motion sensors (accelerometers
and gyroscopes) can measure audio signals, though at a much lower sampling rate. It is
a big threat to smartphone users since the phone’s operating system grants applications
permissions to motion sensors automatically.
Ultra-Unlock uses the microphones and speakers in smartphones to send ultrasound
signals and catch users’ finger movements, then utilizes these user-specific movements to
unlock the phone. It is a great alternative to the password/fingerprint authentication when
users’ fingers are dirty or wet and to the face authentication when users wear masks or
goggles.
MoVo is a spoof-proof voice authentication system that not only authenticates users by
their voices but also differentiates live people and electronic devices. In other words, attackers
are unable to unlock the phone by replay attack (attackers record the victim’s voice in person
or online, then replay the recording and access the victim’s devices illegally). The idea is to
utilize the self demodulation effect and acoustic attenuation effect that occurred when sound
signals transmit through human bodies. Motion sensors are used to catch such signals.
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1.1 Security and Privacy on Smartphones
Compared to traditional feature phones which are capable of voice calls and text
messages, smartphones bring many more applications including, but not limited to, email
checking, web browsing, online shopping, game playing, music listening, video shooting,
and GPS navigation. With such extensive capabilities, smartphones have become
ubiquitous and all-pervasive. Indeed, the total number of smartphone users worldwide is
over 3 billion this year – nearly 40% of the human population, according to reports issued
by several market-research firms [79, 72].
The increasing of smartphone users also increases the importance of protecting the
security and privacy on smartphones. Smartphones hold our important personal information
such as photos and videos, SMS, email, contact list, social media accounts, etc. But existing
powerful OSs and applications are not enough to protect those infromation [4]. For example,
Google confirms an Android camera security threat where ‘hundreds of millions’ of users are
affected 1. The attackers can control the Google Camera app to take photos and/or record
videos through a rogue application 2 that has no permissions to do so.
Researches have done extensive study on the security and privacy problems about
smartphones [4, 134, 20, 53]. They have classified the smartphone problems into four
categories [134]:
• Authentication. There are mainly three ways to authenticate humans: something you
know (PIN, graphical pattern, password, etc.), something you have (One-time passcode
(OTP) via SMS, offline OTP using apps, paired devices, etc.), and something you are
(voice, face, fingerprint, etc.). However, every method has pros and cons and no one is





In this thesis, we also propose a new authentication system Ultra-Unlock. We also
improve the existing voice authentication system against spoofing attacks in MoVo.
• Data Protection and Privacy. Smartphones, like computers, bring the same concerns:
whether or how data is shared with third parties. Researchers have studied data
protection and privacy problems from different perspective [76, 11, 124]. Existing
solutions are mainly designing protocols [135, 116] or utilizing cryptography [85, 40].
• Vulnerabilities. Smartphone vulnerabilities include the following: system
faults/defects, insufficient management of applications, insecure wireless networks,
and lack of user awareness. The hardware and operating systems on smartphones are
evolving and upgrading all the time. They are inevitable to have defects at a certain
stage. Developers are publishing new applications every day. Detecting malware,
hacking, and other harmful codes embedded in the apps is still an open problem [49].
Even when the smartphone is secure, its connection to an insecure network can still
cause S&P problems. Moreover, user awareness is another critical factor for
smartphone security. A previous research [117] suggests that 35% of smartphone
users do not lock their devices to prevent unauthorized persons from using them.
Improving the user awareness level is urgent [55].
• Attacks. Researchers have studied various attacks on smartphones. For example,
researchers propose theft detection algorithms to protect smartphones against physical
attacks [17], and propose liveness detection algorithms to prevent replay attacks [139].
However, there are many other attacks unrevealed or uninvestigated. In this thesis,
we propose the Man-in-the-Phone attack, which turns smartphones into spy bugs.
1.2 Smartphone Sensors: Causes or Solutions
There are no universally applicable solutions to solve the aforementioned security and
privacy issues, so we conduct our research in a case study manner. We propose Spy-Phone
to show how smartphones get eavesdropped by motion sensors, Ultra-Unlock to
authenticate users with gestures in the air, and MoVo to protect voice authentication
system against spoofing attacks. They have one thing in common, utilizing smartphone
2
Table 1.1: General Information
System Category Sensors Targeted Signals
Spy-Phone Attacks, Vulnerabilites Motion Sensors Acoustic Signals
Ultra-Unlock Authentication Micorphones Ultrasound Signals
MoVo Authentication, Attacks Micorphones, Motion Sensors Acoustic Signals
sensors to achieve the goal. The categories of the three proposed systems and sensors used
in each system are shown in Table 1.1. Our main focuses are attacks and authentication
methods on smartphones, using motion sensors and/or microphones.
Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) smartphones nowadays have built-in sensors that
measure motions, orientations, and various environmental conditions. Figure 1.1 shows the
real sensor readings on a Google Nexus 6P smartphone when running the Sensors Toolbox
by ExaMobile. This smartphone has motion sensors (accelerometers, gravity sensors,
gyroscopes, and rotational vector sensors), environmental sensors (barometers,
photometers, and thermometers), position sensors (orientation sensors and
magnetometers), microphones and cameras. Note that the motion sensors are designed to
monitor the motion of a device, but in Spy-Phone and MoVo we use them to measure
acoustic signals. Microphones are designed to record audible sounds, but we use them in
Ultra-Unlock to measure ultrasound signals.
In fact, there have been many research papers related to ‘misusing’ smartphone
sensors. On the one hand, ‘misusing’ sensors introduces S&P problems. For example, Zhou
et al [141] designed PatternListener, which cracks Android pattern lock using acoustic
signals. It leverages speakers and microphones of the victim’s device to play and record
imperceptible audio in order to achieve motion data. Zhang et al. [136] proposed
DolphinAttack, which uses normal speakers to send inaudible voice commands. Since they
modulated voice commands on ultrasonic carriers, popular speech recognition systems,
including Siri, Google Now, and Alexa, will listen to the commands but human ears cannot
detect them. Tripple et al. [113] studied how to use audio signals to control motion sensors
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and proposed WALNUT. They also demonstrated how to inject fake steps into a Fitbit
with a $5 speaker and how to use a malicious music file from a smartphone’s speaker to
control the on-board MEMS accelerometer trusted by a local app to pilot a toy RC car.
On the other hand, ‘misusing’ sensors solves S&P problems. For example, Lee et al. [60]
proposed a multi-sensor authentication system to improve smartphone security. They chose
accelerometers, orientation sensors, and magnetometers to continuously learn the owner’s
behavior patterns and environment characteristics so as to a better authenticate mechanism.
Roy et al. [94] developed the Ripple II system, which uses microphones as a receiver of
vibrations to achieve secure short-range communication. Compared to the ‘normal’ case
where accelerometers are used as the receiver, ‘misusing’ microphone increases the data
rate from 200 bits/s to 30,000 bits/s. Chen et al. [18] utilized magnetometers to differ an
electronic speaker from a real person. Their work will detect the magnetic field emitted from
loudspeakers as the essential characteristic to defend the smartphone against machine-based
voice impersonation attacks.
In this thesis, Spy-Phone is an instance where ‘misusing’ motion sensors causes
information leakage on smartphones, while Ultra-Unlock and MoVo use sensors to solve
security problems.
1.3 Objectives and Contributions
The research objective of this thesis is to come up with new security and privacy (S&P)
issues related to smartphone sensors, and to solve existing S&P problems by utilizing those
embedded sensors.
In the thesis, one new attack is proposed and two novel solutions are introduced to
improve smartphone authentication schemes. A summary of the main contributions are:
• We proposed a new attack on smartphones that uses the data from zero-permission
motion sensors to infer permission-required acoustic information. With Spy-Phone,
a seemingly harmless app will keep eavesdropping on smartphone speakers covertly.
Compared to existing works, this Spy-Phone system is based on a speaker-independent
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machine learning model and therefore smartphones become more vulnerable to such
attacks.
• We proposed MoVo, a new authentication method that is able to authenticate
smartphone users and defend against various voice-spoofing attacks at the same time.
Utilizing motion sensors and microphones, MoVo can successfully detect replay
attackers with an average accuracy of 90.43%.
• We proposed a silent and quick authentication method Ultra-Unlock that allows users
to unlock and control smartphones without touching the phone. The idea is to treat
hand movements as I/Q modulation on ultrasound signals. This system is a good
alternative to other authentication methods when users have wet/dirty hands or wear
gloves/goggles/masks.
In the remainder of this thesis, we will discuss each system in each chapter, and conclude
the thesis in Chapter 5.
5
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Figure 1.1: Real Readings of 18 Sensors on a Google Nexus 6P Device.
CHAPTER 2
SPY-PHONE: EAVESDROPPING ON SMARTPHONE SPEAKERS
WITH MOTION SENSORS
We introduce the Man-in-the-Phone attack, which can turn smartphones into spy
bugs. This attack is based on the fact that motion sensors (accelerometers and gyroscopes)
can measure audio signals, though at a much lower sampling rate. This attack imposes a
big threat to smartphone users since the phone’s operating system grants applications
permissions to motion sensors automatically. Compared to prior works, the
Man-in-the-Phone attack focuses on the intra-device scenario, where motion sensors
eavesdrop on the same phone’s built-in speakers. With compressed sensing theories and
machine learning techniques, we implement the attack in an eavesdropping system called
Spy-Phone, which is able to filch various critical information from smartphone users.
Experiment results show that Spy-Phone can learn user activity, speaker gender, speaker
identity, and speech content with an average accuracy of 81%, 93%, 98%, and up to 90%,
respectively. Apart from the good accuracy, the most significant contribution of this work
is that the Spy-Phone system is speaker-independent. Unlike previous related works that
need specific training data from the victim, Spy-Phone is trained just once on public
speech datasets and can filch critical information from brand new victims.
2.1 Introduction
Smartphones have become one of the most popular devices in the last few years.
According to Statista 1, the current number of smartphone users in the world today is over
3 billion, and this means nearly 40% of the world’s population owns a smartphone.
In this thesis, however, we demonstrate how to turn smartphones to spy bugs which
eavesdrop on everything played by smartphones’ built-in speakers. Three billion
smartphones? No, they are 3 billion spy-phones! This dreadful attack, referred to as the
Man-in-the-Phone attack, is based on the fact that motion sensors (accelerometers and
1https://www.statista.com/statistics/330695/number-of-smartphone-users-worldwide/
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I GOT IT, TOO.
Figure 2.1: Example of an Attacking Scenario by Spy-Phone. A seemingly harmless
application (a weather app for example) is installed on the phone, and it keeps accessing
the motion sensors in the background. Attackers can infer acoustic signals from the under-
sampled motion data.
gyroscopes) can catch acoustic signals like a crude microphone. Thanks to smartphones’
operating systems, accessing these sensors is effortless. For example, Android 2
automatically grants app permissions to motion sensors at installation time. In other
words, any app installed in a smartphone can be a tool for attackers to eavesdrop covertly.
An example of attacking scenarios is illustrated in Figure 2.1. A boy has a video call
with his mom. He wants to buy a book online and he needs her mom’s credit information to
place an order. Her mom’s voice is played by the loudspeaker on the smartphone and affects
the readings by motion sensors. The attacker has access to the motion data and therefore
can infer the credit card information.
In fact, there have been some recent studies about the side-channel leakage from acoustic
signals to smartphones’ motion sensor readings. Michalevsky et al. [74] proposed Gyrophone
in 2014. To the best of our knowledge, they are the first to use smartphone gyroscopes as
low-frequency microphones to listen to loudspeakers. Gyrophone can differentiate 11 digits
with 65% accuracy based on a 10 people dataset. One year later, Zhang et al. [137] proposed
AccelWord, which utilizes accelerometers to classify hotwords such as “Okay Google” or “Hi
Galaxy” over other short phrases with 85% accuracy. AccelWord is also tested over 10
people.
2iOS, Windows, and Blackberry OS have similar permission-based sensor management systems [102]. In this work,
we focus on Android.
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However, techniques proposed in neither Gyrophone nor AccelWord can be used to
perform a Man-in-the-Phone attack. Because these systems are built upon a
speaker-dependent model, i.e. training dataset are labeled data from the target speakers.
In the Man-in-the-Phone attack, attackers will not get labeled motion data from the victim
—— the attack system should be speaker-independent.
In 2018, Anald and Saxena [5] reproduced the aforementioned works and overturned
their conclusions. They argued that smartphone motion sensors can not be affected by the
speech signals transmitted through the air, no matter the sound source is a loudspeaker or
a live person. They reported that only when the speakers and the motion sensors sharing
a surface, the conductive vibrations will affect motion sensors’ readings. Except for this
“Loudspeaker-Same-Surface” scenario, they studied 5 other scenarios 3 and concluded that
smartphone motion sensors only pose a limited threat to speech privacy. However, they
missed one important scenario, the intra-device scenario, where the speakers and motion
sensors are inside the same smartphone. In 2019, they investigated this remaining scenario
in an arXiv paper [6] and their SpearPhone system recognizes 11 digits with an accuracy of
71%. However, their technique is still speaker-dependent, which means the original speech
data of the target speaker must be collected ahead of time. Such a requirement is very hard
to be fulfilled in practice.
In this thesis, we studied the side-channel attack in the intra-device scenario. This
Man-in-the-Phone attack, as we refer to it, is speaker-independent.








Samsung Galaxy S8 2017 192,000 Hz 500 Hz
Samsung Galaxy S7 2016 192,000 Hz 500 Hz
Google Nexus 6P 2015 48,000 Hz 400 Hz
LG Nexus 4 2012 48,000 Hz 200 Hz
3“Loudspeaker-Different-Surface”, “Laptop-Same-Surface”, “ Phone-Different-Surface”, “Human-Normal”, and
“Human-Loud”.
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The main challenges in designing such a system are:
• The motion sensor readings are affected by at least four types of signal sources:
sensor intrinsic errors, movement of the smartphone, acoustic vibrations from built-in
speakers, acoustic vibrations from the air or other sound sources. An efficient filter is
needed since only the acoustic vibrations from built-in speakers is the signal of
interest.
• As shown in Table 2.1, compared to the sampling rate of smartphones’ built-in speakers
which can reach 192 kHz, the sampling rate of motion sensors is 200-500 Hz. With
such low frequency, human ears are no longer able to retrieve the original information,
neither do state-of-the-art speech recognition systems [74].
• As illustrated in Figure 2.2, the system should be speaker-independent. Prior works
such as Gyrophone [74] and AccelWord [137] can only achieve the claimed accuracy
(65% for 11 classes and 85% for 3 classes) in the speaker-dependent setting. When
Gyrophone uses a speaker-independent setting to identify digits, the accuracy is only
26%. This indicates that building a speaker-independent system is much more
challenging than a speaker-dependent one.
Despite these challenges, the Spy-Phone system is able to learn a variety of critical
information from smartphone users, such as user activity, speaker gender/identity, and
speech content (as elaborated in Section 2.3). These achievements are largely credited to
the compressed sensing theories which allow recovering certain signals from fewer samples
than required in Nyquist paradigm (as elaborated in Section 2.2); and the machine
learning techniques named Bi-directional Long Short-Term Memory (Bi-LSTM) network,
which is a special variant of recurrent neural networks.

























(a) Speaker-Dependent: the target speaker’s training data
is required. After machine learning procedures, the trained
models for different speakers are different.
Sound Data











(b) Speaker-Independent: the model is trained on a group of
speakers, and can be used to predict brand new speakers.
Figure 2.2: Man-in-the-Phone Attack Should be Speaker-Independent.
In summary, our main contributions are as follows:
• We uncover a new stealth attack named the Man-in-the-Phone attack that
eavesdrops on smartphones’ built-in speakers by the intra-device motion sensors.
Existing techniques in Gyrophone [74] and AccelWord [137] cannot be used for the
Man-in-the-Phone attack because their systems are speaker-dependent, which require
the training speech data from the victim. The Man-in-the-Phone attack, however,
removes this requirement and thus is more dangerous and harmful.
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply compressed sensing theories
in the audio-to-motion side-channel data so as to bridge the gap between sampling
rates. This is the core technique we used to achieve the speaker-independence of the
attacking system.
• We design the Spy-Phone system and validate its feasibility on learning user activity,
speaker gender/identity, and speech content. Spy-Phone system can achieve higher
accuracy than existing works. Besides, we have studied how different internal
parameters (used in algorithms) and external parameters (properties of input data)
affect the performance of this system.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Voice Acoustics
The generation of human voice follows a source-filter model [33]. A speech signal can be
seen as a source signal (the glottal source at the larynx, or noise generated at a constriction
in the vocal tract), filtered with the resonances in the cavities of the vocal tract (tongue,
teeth, lips, velum, etc. modifying the sound spectrum over time). This theory has been
verified using 3-D printed models of two configurations of a vocal tract to generate sounds
to generate the vowels in the words “had” and “heard” [129].
A typical adult male will have a fundamental frequency (f0) of from 85 to 155 Hz, and
that of a typical adult female from 165 to 255 Hz [7, 111]. The frequencies of the first,
second, and the i-th resonances are labeled as R1, R2, . . . Ri, and those of the spectral peaks
produced by these resonances are called formants, F1, F2, . . . Fi [112]. According to [58],
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English vowels are perceived largely according to the values of the formants F1 and F2. The
range of F1 is roughly from 270 to 860 Hz, and that of F2 from 840 to 2790 Hz [86]. As
for English consonants, there are six categories: plosive/stop (e.g. /p/), fricative (e.g. /f/),
affricate (e.g. /dZ/), nasal (e.g. /m/), lateral (e.g. /l/), and approximant (e.g. /r/). The
frequencies of consonants vary a lot. The turbulence of /s/ and /z/ occurs above 3500Hz,
and reaches as high as 10,000 Hz, whereas /w/ has F1 from 250 to 450 Hz and F2 from 600
to 850 Hz [57].
By Nyquist–Shannon sampling theorem, to properly sample a signal contains no
frequency components higher than f Hz, the sampling rate must be at least 2f Hz
(Nyquist rate). In other words, a sampling rate of 400 Hz (motion sensors’ rate as shown
in Table 2.1) can only handle signals whose component frequencies are below 200 Hz.
Except for the part of the fundamentals, all F1 and F2 frequencies can not be sensed.
Therefore, it is impossible to perceive the signals with such a low sampling rate.
However, borrowing theories from compressed sensing, the Spy-Phone system can
partially reconstruct the signal and obtain critical information such as the numbers that
appeared in a conversation, genders, or even identities of the speakers, etc., from motion
sensor readings, as discussed in Section 2.3.
2.2.2 Compressed Sensing
Compressed sensing [29] (also known as compressive sensing [101], compressive
sampling [15]) is a novel sensing/sampling paradigm that acquires and reconstructs signals
in a much more efficient way than the established Nyquist–Shannon sampling theorem.
First introduced by Candes et al. in 2004 [13], compressed sensing takes advantage of
prior knowledge about inherent characteristics (sparsity) of signals. In this way, even with
far fewer samples, the signal of interest can still be perfectly (or nearly perfectly) recovered.
The constraint of the Nyquist rate (sampling rate to be 2 times of signal bandwidth) is no



































Figure 2.3: Mathematical Model of a Typical Compressed Sensing System.
As shown in Figure 2.3, the theory of compressed sensing has solid mathematical
backgrounds. The signals of interest should have a low information rate, i.e., the signal is
sparse in its original domain (e.g. time domain) or some transform domain (e.g. frequency
domain) [16]. More precisely, when expressed in a proper representation dictionary D, a
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large number of coefficients in vector w are zeros or small enough to be ignored. In fact,
natural signals such as sounds, images, or seismic data have this sparsity property and can
be stored in compressed form, in terms of their projection on a suitable dictionary [90].
In the signal acquisition stage, compressed sensing aims to undersample the signal
of interest such that the dimension size M of measurements x is much smaller than the
dimension size N of the signal s. This goal is achieved by using a sensing matrix S of
size M × N , where M ≪ N . The reconstruction of the original signal is essentially an





where γ is the parameter to balance the evaluation weight of sparsity versus data error,
‖w′‖p is the ℓp-norm of w
′, and R is the reconstruction matrix which is equal to S ×D. As
γ increases the solution is getting more sparse. When p = 0, this optimization problem has
been proved to be NP-hard [78].
The overall performance of compressed sensing is determined by 3 aspects: how
representative is the dictionary, how efficient is the sensing matrix, and how well-performed
is optimization solver. There are mainly two types of dictionaries, predefined dictionaries
and learned dictionaries. Predefined dictionaries are built from basic functions like Fourier
transform. Common dictionaries of this type include the discrete cosine transform basis,
wavelet packages, and Gabor bases [105]. Learned dictionaries are learned from a training
dataset of signals. Methods to build such type of dictionaries include K-SVD [2], MOD
ILS-DLA [31], ODL [67], RLS-DLA [104], and so on. As for the design of the sensing
matrix, it is important to check whether the matrix will allow the recovery of a sparse
solution. The most famous one is the restricted isometry property [14], though it has been
shown too strict [28]. The signal reconstruction solvers span a wide series of techniques
that include greedy pursuit, Bayesian framework, iterative thresholding, convex relaxation,
nonconvex optimization, and brute force [115]. Some well-known solvers include
OMP [114], GPSR [35], BCS [51], and so on. More information can be found in survey
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papers like [140, 105, 92].
In our attack design, the audio signals played by smartphone speakers are the signals of
interest. When the sound is collected by motion sensors, it is essentially the signal acquisition
stage that applies the sensing matrix to get the measurements. The motion data has a very
low sampling rate, much lower than the Nyquist rate. However, using a carefully designed
reconstruction matrix, the original signals of interest can be (partially) reconstructed from
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Figure 2.4: Structure of a Desktop Loudspeaker Versus a MEMS Speaker.
Figure 2.4 shows the different structures of a typical desktop loudspeaker and a Micro
Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) speaker in smartphones. In a desktop loudspeaker,
sounds are created by alternating currents to the voice coil, while a smartphone speaker uses
a small MEMS tweeter. As a result, the MEMS speaker consumes much less power than the
desktop loudspeaker. But for the same reason, the sound pressure level (SPL) generated by
MEMS speakers is much lower than that of desktop loudspeakers.
The Google Nexus 6P and Samsung Galaxy S8 used in this work can only generate sound
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with a maximum output of 78.4 dB 5. The commercial off-the-shelf desktop loudspeaker, the
$22.99 Logitech Multimedia Speakers Z200 as an example, has max SPL greater than 88 dB.
Note that a normal speech between two people typically has a range of 50 to 60 decibels and
when they are shouting, the range goes to about 75 dB while 15% of men can shout over 96
dB [12]. The higher the decibels, the easier for the motion sensors to catch the sound signals.
With this respect, performing the Man-in-the-Phone attack is harder than Gyrophone [74]
or AccelWord [137].
As for the motion sensors, Google Nexus 6P uses Bosch BMI160, whose sampling rate
can be 1600 Hz. However, the Android operating system only supports up to 400 Hz in
order to save power.
2.3 Threat Model in the Spy-Phone System
The attacker’s goal is to eavesdrop on everything played by the smartphone speakers
without the user’s awareness.
The attack begins when the user installs a seemingly innocent application, e.g. a car
racing game with motion-control steering wheel (tilt the smartphone to steer). We assume
such a disguised app has the access to motion sensors (accelerometers and gyroscopes) as
well as the network. This assumption is easy to fulfill since the permissions to motion
sensors and the internet are all considered as normal permissions by the Android operating
system 6. In other words, Android automatically grants the app these permissions at
installation time. The operating system doesn’t prompt the user to grant permissions, and
users cannot revoke these permissions. Moreover, almost every smartphone has motion
sensors and is able to connect to the Internet. The Man-in-the-Phone attack is therefore a
threat to every smartphone user.
There is no other requirement for the attacker to conduct a Man-in-the-Phone attack.
The disguised app just runs in the background and keeps monitoring the motion sensors.




motion sensors are in use. In addition, some smartphones are set to be “Rotation On” or
“Lift to Unlock”, which means the operating system automatically collects motion data, and
the Spy-Phone system does not introduce extra consumption by using the sensors.
The sensor data are sent back to the attacker over wireless networks. The attacker can
choose to transmit data only when the smartphone is connected to Wi-Fi; otherwise, the
user may notice the attack through suspicious cellar data usage. The data will be processed
at the attacker’s end. By utilizing compressed sensing, machine learning and other signal
processing techniques, Spy-Phone recovers critical information from undersampled motion
data. The critical information could be, but not limited to,
• User activity. Using motion sensor to recognize user activity is not new. However,
those activities (e.g., sitting, walking, running or exercising) are recognized based on
different macro motions. Spy-Phone, on the other hand, is utilizing the micro motions
caused by speakers. Therefore, Spy-Phone can tell whether a user is listening to music
or watching an online talk even when the phone seems stationary. Smartphones’ built-
in speakers are often used for alarms, phone call ringing, music listening, background
sound for game playing, and so on. Different activity plays different sound and creates
different motion sensor readings. The Spy-Phone system can be trained to classify the
motion data to these different user activities. Put the matter another way, an attacker
can know when the user wakes up, when she receives phone calls, how long she listens
to music, or how long she plays games, and so on.
• Speaker gender/identity. When the smartphone user has a audio call, video call, or
an online meeting with others, the Man-in-the-Phone attackers can learn whether the
person she talks to is female or male. Spy-Phone can also learn how often the user
contacts each different person. Moreover, if the attacker could get those people’s voice
samples (either by recording in public area, or acquiring from social media online, etc.),
the attacker can know exactly who they are.
• Speech content. Another goal for the attacker is to recover the whole speech content by
motion sensors. However, considering the tremendous gap between the sampling rate
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of smartphone speakers and motion sensors, there is still a long way before success. In
Section 2.4, as a proof-of-concept, we use digit recognition to demonstrate the design
of the Spy-Phone system, since the most critical information such as banking account
numbers, credit card information, and certain passwords, are essentially combinations
of digits. In Section 2.5, command recognition is also tested.
In addition, It is worth mentioning that the Man-in-the-Phone attack is built upon a
speaker-independent machine learning model and does not require any specific training data
from the user. Though with such data, the accuracy might be further improved. Prior works
such as Gyrophone [74] and AccelWord [137] can only be used in the speaker-dependent case.
Using their techniques, the user must obtain the victim’s speech first, which is harder to be
carried out in reality.
2.4 Attack Design
The workflow of the Man-in-the-Phone attack in Spy-Phone is shown in Figure 2.5. The
system can be separated into two parts: the user side and the attacker side. On the user
side, a smartphone user downloads a seemingly harmless application and installs it on her
device. Then the disguised app runs in the background and keeps monitoring the motion
sensors. The sensor readings are then uploaded and sent to the attacker. On the attacker
side, there are training steps and prediction steps. The training steps start from a training
dataset that contains both sound data and motion data, while the input for prediction steps
only contains motion data.
The training steps first apply compressed sensing techniques on the sound data and build
a learned dictionary from audio files, then process the corresponding motion data to remove
unwanted signal components. With the preprocessed motion data and a learned dictionary,
the signal is reconstructed to a signal with more samples. Afterward, the reconstructed
signal is fed to a Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (Bi-LSTM) network to train a
classification model. The classification labels/classes (e.g. digits, genders, activity types,





























Figure 2.5: The Man-in-the-Phone Attack Workflow in the Spy-Phone System.
The prediction steps start with motion data, go by preprocessing, adopt the learned
dictionary to reconstruct signals, and finally use the trained Bi-LSTM model to output
critical information, without the presence of sound data.
In this section, we explain in detail how the Spy-Phone system implements the
Man-in-the-Phone attack to eavesdrop on digits played by smartphone speakers. A similar
approach can be applied to obtain user activity type or speaker gender/identity as
evaluated in Section 2.5.
2.4.1 Training Dataset
Table 2.2: Dataset Information
Dataset TIDIGITS [62] Speech Commands [127]
Sampling Rate 20,000 Hz 16,000 Hz
No. Speakers 326 2,618
Labels 11 Digits 35 Command Words
No. Utterances 7,172 105,829
Training Size 3,586 84,843
Validation Size - 9,981
Testing Size 3,586 11,005
As shown in Table 2.2, we use two datasets, TIDIGITS and Speech Commands.
TIDIGITS [62] are professional recordings of isolated digits, which has been used in [74]
and [6]. Therefore, in the main sessions of this chapter, we illustrated our system using this
dataset for the comparison’s purpose. However, TIDIGITS only contains digits, and the
utterances are all recorded in laboratory conditions. It is natural that the accuracy would
be higher on such a dataset. Therefore, we consider another dataset Speech Commands [127],
which is the TensorFlow Speech Commands Dataset(Version 2). This dataset can be used
for limited-vocabulary speech recognition. It consists of 105,829 utterances of 35 command
words such as up, down, forward, stop, house, happy, etc. This dataset is recorded by a
web-based application in a crowd-sourcing manner. Speakers are from all over the world and
they speak the commands in uncontrolled environments. Basically, if a model trained on
Speech Commands works well, it indicates that any piece of speech recordings online can be
21
used as the training data for the Spy-Phone system. The result using this dataset is shown
in Section 2.5.2, the correct rate is 83.2%.
From now on, we focus on TIDIGITS.
Figure 2.6: Spy-Phone Data Collection Application
In the beginning, the TIDIGITS dataset is used to build both the sound data and the
motion data for the training dataset. This corpus contains speech of 11 isolated digits:
“one”, “two”, . . . , “nine”, “zero” and “oh”, which are collected using an Electro-Voice RE-
16 Dynamic Cardiod microphone, digitized at 20,000 Hz. These audio files are directly used
as training sound data. The motion data, however, are collected by playing these audio
files using the built-in speakers of a Google Nexus 6P device. They are the simultaneous
recordings from the same phone’s accelerometers and gyroscopes with a sampling rate of 400
Hz. When playing the sound, the volume is set to be the highest level since these data will
be used for training and the higher volume, the higher accuracy (according to experiments
in Section 2.6.4). Note that when the Man-in-the-Phone attack is conducted in practice,
the input motion data may come from a lower volume setting defined by the user. The
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Algorithm 1: BuildDictionary
Input: Training Sound Dataset Ti for class i, Downsample Rate r, Dictionary Size
(N,K)
Output: Dictionary Di for class i
1 Si ← [] // Initialize training vectors
2 foreach audio file τ in Ti do
// get signal s and sampling frequency fs
3 [s, fs] = audioRead(τ)
// remove unvoiced part
4 s← removeSilence(s)
// downsample signal to r subsignals and buffer each subsignal of
length N
5 foreach j from 1 to r do
6 s← shiftLeft(s, 1) // shift left by 1 sample
7 ss← downSample(s, r)
8 bs← buffer(ss,N)
9 Si ← concatenate(Si, bs)
// run K-SVD dictionary training algorithm
10 Di ← kvsd(Si, N,K)
attacker cannot control the volume setting of the target smartphone, but she can control
the volume when building the training dataset. For the training dataset, only part of the
sound and motion data are used. The impact of the training data size on the prediction
accuracy is elaborated in Section 2.6.1. All data are collected by the SpyPhoneApp as shown
in Figure 2.6.
2.4.2 Dictionary Learning
We now demonstrate how to construct efficient representations of audio files by building
a dictionary learned from the data itself. Recall Section 2.2.2, a learned dictionary is used
to reconstruct a signal when it is undersampled. In the Spy-Phone system, the sound data
are the signals of interest while the motion data are the measurements. The training sound
data are grouped into 11 classes, (one to nine, zero, and oh). For each class i, the dataset is
denoted by Ti and the representation dictionary Di is computed by Algorithm 1.
As shown in Figure 2.3, each representation dictionary Di is a collection of K atoms,
where each atom is a column vector of lengthN . An atom is basically some typical patterns of













Figure 2.7: Example of Learned Dictionary Atoms. For each digit class, two different
atoms are shown.
as a linear combination of some few of the dictionary atoms. Mathematically, si = Di ∗ wi,
for each column si in Si. Here Si is the training vectors calculated in Algorithm 1. Compared
to the original sound signal from an audio file, Si is the result from many functions including
removeSilence(), downSample(), and buffer().
Note that the length of a dictionary atom must be the same as the length of the training
vector si. Since the original sound signal can have at most 2 s × 20,000 Hz = 40,000 samples
(The duration of audio files in the dataset is at most 2 seconds.). If directly using original
sound to train the dictionary, the atom size must be 40,000 as well. However, not all signals
in an audio file are informative. By applying removeSilence(), the unvoiced part of the
audio signals is removed, which significantly improves the space and time efficiency of the
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algorithm. The removeSilence() is based on [91], which calculates the short-time energy
of signals and conducts zero-crossing analysis to differentiate sounding and unvoiced parts.
Moreover, from voice acoustics elaborated in Section 2.2.1, the most informative
frequency range is roughly 100-4000 Hz, the 20,000 Hz sampling rate oversamples human
speech. Therefore, to build a better representation dictionary, we shift the signals (Line 6
in Algorithm 1) and downsample it (Line 7 in Algorithm 1) by keeping the first sample and
then every r-th sample after the first. The impact of the downsample rate r is evaluated in
Section 2.6.2.
Last but not least, different people say different digits with intrinsically different time
duration, which results in different signal lengths. To build a general representation
dictionary, we buffer every signal with the fixed buffer size as N using buffer(). In other
words, no matter how long is the original sound signal, by Algorithm 1, it is transformed
into a matrix Si with N rows. The number of columns, however, is not fixed. For
convenience’s sake, we denote this number as Li.
Dictionary Learning is the process of finding a dictionary, Di of size N × K, and a
corresponding coefficient matrix Wi of size K × Li such that the approximations of the
training vectors, Si of size N × Li, are as good as possible, given a sparseness criterion on
the coefficients. Mathematically, the dictionary learning problem can be formulated as an






(γ‖wi,l‖p + ‖si,l −Diwi,l‖2) ,
where γ and p are as in Eq. (2.1), si,l is the l-th column of Si, and wi,l is the l-th column of
Wi.
The solver we use for this optimization problem is K-SVD [2], as it is one of the most well-
known shared dictionary learning algorithms [131]. We did not test all existing dictionary
learning algorithms, but among those we tested, PCA [44], K-SVD, and GAD [50], K-SVD
provides the best results.
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K-SVD is an iterative method with two main steps: First, keep Di fixed then solve Wi,
which is essentially Li separate problems as in Eq. (2.1); Second, keep only non-zero positions
in Wi fixed and find Di and W using singular-value decompositions (SVD). Figure 2.7 shows
the first two atoms in the learned dictionary of each digit class using K-SVD. Generally, the
atoms are different inter-class and similar intra-class.
By concatenating every Di together, the overall dictionary is
D = [D1, D2, . . . , Di, . . . , D11] , (2.2)
which will be used for signal reconstruction in later steps.
2.4.3 Motion Data Preprocessing
The input motion data are collected similarly to how motion data are collected for the
training dataset, i.e., playing TIDIGITS audio files by the smartphone’s built-in speakers.
However, since these data are to simulate the attacking scenarios in reality, the data are
collected multiple times using 15 different volume settings (Section 2.6.4). Moreover, we
collected the motion data in both quiet and noisy environment (Section 2.6.5), and in both
stable and moving states (Section 2.6.6).






































Figure 2.8: The Magnitude and Phase Response of the FIR Highpass filter.
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(a) Raw Motion Data.






















(b) Spectrogram of Raw Motion Signals.

























































(d) Preprocessed Motion Data
Figure 2.9: Preprocessing of Motion Data. The top two figures show the raw data from
3-axis accelerometers and 3-axis gyroscopes. There are 450 samples shown in the figure.
These samples span about one second (450 / 400Hz = 1.125s) and are collected when the
user is dropping the head of the phone while playing a “Zero” utterance from a male speaker.
The frequency of such movement is far less than the frequency of human voices. Therefore,
by applying the high pass filter, the noise caused by hand movements will be removed.
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As mentioned in Section 2.1, the motion data is impeded by low sampling rates, weak
target signals, and large interference noises. To overcome such problems, we must preprocess
the motion data. We apply a high pass filter to mitigate the noise and increase the signal-
to-noise ratio. The cutoff frequency is set to be 50 Hz, since noises such as walking or other
human body movements are unlikely to generate signals as high as 50 Hz. We also use the
speech-background separation algorithms from [91] to differentiate the data affected by sound
signals from those do not. The red vertical lines in Figure 2.9a are the borderlines between
the speech part and the background part. Figure 2.9b and Figure 2.9c show that various
noises can be removed by applying a high pass filter. The result after the preprocessing stage
is shown in Figure 2.9d. These data will be used in the next signal reconstruction stage.
2.4.4 Signal Reconstruction
In this stage, the preprocessed motion data will be used to reconstruct the original audio
data.
Mathematically, the goal of signal reconstruction is to solve w′ in x = R × w′ as in
Figure 2.3. Here the measurement x is the motion data after preprocessing, and the
reconstruction matrix R is calculated by
R = S ×D, (2.3)
where S is the sensing matrix and D is the dictionary obtained in Section 2.4.2.
In the Spy-Phone system, the sensing matrix describes the sensing procedure from
audio data to motion data, which can be regarded as a downsampling operation. The
downsampling rate (r) is determined by the sampling frequencies of smartphone speakers
(f1) and motion sensors (f2): r = f1/f2. For example, a sensing matrix with downsample
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In the Spy-Phone system, the true value of this rate can be as high as 48,000 / 400 =
120, which indicates a huge information loss and a big challenge to recover the signals.
Note that Algorithm 1 also has a downsampling operation (Line 7), therefore the
R = S ×D operation can be replaced by changing the parameter r in Algorithm 1. When
reconstructing the signals, D is used as R. The impact of the downsample rate r is
evaluated in Section 2.6.2. To solve Eq. (2.3), GPSR [35] is used, which is able to find
w′opt = argminw′ (γ‖w
′‖p + ‖x−Rw
′‖2) . The last step is to reconstruct the signal of
interests by s′ = D × w′opt. These signals will be used as training data for the Bi-LSTM
network discussed in the next section.
2.4.5 Bi-LSTM Learing
The last stage is to use the reconstructed data to establish a Bi-directional Long
Short-Term Memory (Bi-LSTM) network model, which will be used for classifying the
input data later on. LSTM was first proposed by Sepp Hochreiter and Jürgen Schmidhuber
in 1997 [45]. It is a special variant of Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN), and is widely
used in learning, processing, and classifying sequential data because of its great property
of selectively remembering patterns for long durations of time. Over the years, there have
also been many variants of LSTM networks. However, based on a study in 2017, none of
the variants can improve upon the standard LSTM architecture significantly [38].
Therefore, we still choose to implement the standard LSTM network in this work except
for the bi-directional calculation. The original unidirectional LSTM network only preserves
information from the inputs seen in the past. Bi-LSTM network, on the contrary, preserves
information both from the past and the future. As shown in Figure 2.10, our Bi-LSTM
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Figure 2.10: The Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory Network (Bi-LSTM Network).
network has five layers in total. In the sequence input layer, the input data have 6 feature
dimensions, which consists of 3 accelerometer dimensions and 3 gyroscope dimensions.
Then we establish an LSTM layer formed by LSTM blocks, where each block publishes its
cell state to the next LSTM block. The output of the LSTM layer is sent to the fully
connected hidden status layer. We set the total number of hidden units to be 100, and
each hidden unit has two hidden states, one from the past and the other from the future.
Then we feed the combined hidden status to a softmax function and output the
classification results.
2.5 Feasibility Experiments
In this section, we validate the Spy-Phone system and show it can eavesdrop on
smartphone’s built-in speakers and obtain critical information discussed in Section 2.3.
30
31
Table 2.3: Comparison with Prior Works



































1 to 9, Oh, Zero (11) Speaker-dependent: 71%
Speaker Identification 80%
Speaker Gender 90%




1 to 9, Oh, Zero (11) Speaker-independent: 90%
User Activity 81%
Speaker Gender 93%
The main result and the comparison to prior works are summarized in Table 2.3.
2.5.1 Speech Content Learning (Digits)
The TIDIGITS dataset [62] has 7172 audio files of isolated digits. We use 3586 of them
(3586 / 7172 =50%) to train the dictionary. With the downsample rate r set to 40, dictionary
size set to (N=400, K=10), and the p-norm set to be the ℓ1-norm (absolute value), we learn
an overall dictionary of size 400 × 110 by concatenating each dictionary of each individual
digit class. For each audio file, we play it by smartphones’ built-in speakers for 30 times.
Therefore, the size of the motion data is actually 30 times of the size of the sound data in
the training dataset. The Bi-LSTM network is actually trained with 3586 × 30=107,580
data, which are the resulted signals after preprocessing and signal reconstruction. Note that
although this number seems big, each data is just 1-second data at a sampling rate of 400
Hz, and each sample is 16 bits. So the total size is 107,580 × 400 × 16 = 688,512,000 bits
= 86.1 MB, which is indeed not big at all.
The test data is motion data from the remaining 3586 audio files. This data has never
been seen by the Bi-LSTM network before. The classification result is shown as a
confusion matrix in Figure 2.11. In the confusion matrix, each row of the matrix represents
the instances in a predicted/output class while each column represents the instances in an
actual/target class. The digit class “zero” has the highest classification accuracy of 98.6%.
The digit class “eight” has the lowest accuracy: only 70.5% instances are classified to the
correct class, while 16.2% are classified as “six”. The overall accuracy of all 11 classes is
90.13%, with a sensitivity (true positive rate) of 90.13% and a specificity (true negative
rate) of 99.02%.
2.5.2 Speech Content Learning (Commands)
The TensorFlow Speech Commands Dataset Version 2 [127] was used for
limited-vocabulary speech recognition. This dataset consists of 105,829 utterances of 35
words such as forward, house, happy, etc. A random guessing provides accuracy of 1/35 =










































































































































































Accuracy: 90.13% Error Rate: 9.87%
Precision: 90.13% True Positive Rate (Sensitivity/Recall): 90.71%
F1 Score: 0.901 True Negative Rate (Specificity): 99.02%
False Negative Rate: 9.29% False Positive Rate: 0.98%
Figure 2.11: The Confusion Matrix of the Digit Classification Result.
TIDIGITS, as TIDIGITS are professionally recorded while the commands data are
crowdsourced online. Using the original 16,000 Hz audio data can only achieve accuracy of
88.2% [127]. Spy-Phone (using 400 Hz motion data) has the correct rate of
73.4/88.2=83.2%.
2.5.3 Speaker Gender Classification and Speaker Identification
The same training and testing data are also used for gender classification and speaker





























True Positive Rate : 88.28%
F1 Score: 0.934
True Negative Rate: 99.12%
False Negative Rate: 11.72%
False Positive Rate: 0.88%
Figure 2.12: The Confusion Matrix of the Speaker Gender Classification Result.
result for gender classification is shown in Figure 2.12.
2.5.4 User Activity Classification (Sound Type)
We also test whether the Spy-Phone can classify the type of sound signals played by
smartphone speakers. The dataset consists of two parts: the first is the built-in (default)
alarm sounds, notification sounds and ringtones provided by the Android operating system,
the other is the speech sounds from the TIMIT [52] dataset where 10 sentences are spoken by
each speaker. In detail, we obtain 18 alarm sounds, 11 notification sounds, and 12 ringtones
from /system/media/sound/ on a Google Nexus 6P smartphone with an Android 8.1 “Oreo”
system. The speech data consist of 10 sentences from a male speaker and 10 sentences from
a female speaker. We increase the atom size N to 800 when building the dictionary, so that
the measurement size is 800 as well, which means a piece of motion data of 800 / 400 Hz
= 2 seconds. In other words, when classifying the sound type, we evaluate the motion data
using a 2-second threshold, which is longer than that of classifying the digit (1 second).
The result is shown in Figure 2.13. The Spy-Phone system can successfully differentiate
between different sound types with an overall accuracy of 80.56%, which means attackers
can know when you get up in the morning (“Alarm”), when you receive a notification
(“Notification”), when you are called by others (“Ringtone”), and when the person from the
other end of call starts speaking (“Ringtone” followed by “Speech”). Moreover, attackers can




















































True Positive Rate: 72.49%
F1 Score: 0.720
True Negative Rate: 94.07%
False Negative Rate: 27.51%
False Positive Rate: 5.93%
Figure 2.13: The Confusion Matrix of the Sound Type Classification Result.
“Ringtone” as a precursor). In other words, various sound-related user activities are not
secrets to Man-in-the-Phone attackers, not to mention that motion-related activities can be
monitored by motion sensors as a default. Note that the average accuracy of identifying
“speech” is 94.7%, so the Spy-Phone system can first determine whether the input belongs
to “speech”, then classify the speaker gender/identity or the digit class as mentioned above.
The overall accuracy is much lower because of the other three classes. These classes are
misclassified since alarm sounds, notification sounds and ringtones are not strictly defined.
Android groups them in a generally conventional way, not by scientific methods. In fact,
smartphone users may choose to use ringtones as alarms, or use alarm sounds as ringtones.
Such inherent ambiguity is the main reason for the low accuracy. To further improve the
accuracy, more features such as the total duration (“notification” tends to be shorter than
“ringtones”) or the repetitive (“alarm” tends to ring once a day) should be considered.
Integrating algorithms to learn these features is a potential future work for a better design
of Spy-Phone.
2.6 Impact Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the impact of two internal parameters and three external
parameters on the performance of the Spy-Phone system for digit classification. The internal
parameters control how the dictionary is learned and the external parameters control the
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quality of input motion data. Note that a random guess results in an accuracy of 1/11 =
9.09%.
2.6.1 Impact of Training Data Size













Figure 2.14: Impact of Training Data Size.
The size of training data for dictionary learning is an internal parameter. In the previous
section, we use 3586 audio files (50% of full dataset) to train the dictionary. In this section,
we vary the size from 660 to 1760 and show the experiment results in Figure 2.14, which
is a box and whisker plot7. We can see that the classification accuracy increases from
∼56% to ∼78% as the data size increases. This result is reasonable since the more data
is used in training, the learned dictionary is more representative and the machine learning
model is more accurate. In fact, recent researches have shown that to build a representation
dictionary, the typically sufficient number of training samples grows up quasilinearly with
the signal dimension, i.e., O(N logN) [93]. In our experiment, the atom size N is set to be
400, therefore, several hundred or a few thousand of training data should be enough.
2.6.2 Impact of Downsampling Rate
The downsampling rate r is the other internal parameter to study. This parameter is
influenced by four frequencies: the sampling rate of smartphones’ built-in speakers
7The ends of the box are the upper and lower quartiles (25th and 75th percentiles), the central line inside
the box indicates the median, the whiskers extend to the highest and lowest accuracy values not considered
outliers, and the outliers are plotted individually using the ‘+’ symbol.
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Figure 2.15: Impact of Downsampling Rate.
(48,000 Hz in Nexus 6P), the sampling rate to record human speech (20,000 Hz in
TIDIGIT), the frequency range of human speech (100-4,000 Hz), and the sampling rate of
motion sensors (400 Hz in Nexus 6P). We vary this rate from 5 to 50 and find that the
performance of Spy-Phone improves with the increase of the downsampling rate at the
beginning, then the accuracy enters a relatively stable stage when r = 30 and r = 40. The
accuracy declines if a higher downsampling rate is used (r = 50). From Figure 2.15, when
r ∈ [20, 50], the average accuracy is above 90%. We do not test the cases when r > 50,
because 50 = 20, 000Hz/400Hz is the gap between the sampling rate of training sound
data and that of motion data. If we use a larger downsampling rate, the learned atoms
would contain less information than the motion data, which invalidates the dictionary and
contradicts with the goal of using compressed sensing to reconstruct more signal samples.
2.6.3 Impact of Training Device
We tested whether the trained LSTM network is robust across different devices. Due to
time limit, only two devices are tested with the result shown in Table 2.4. Different devices
with same model, and different devies with different model will be tested as a future work.
2.6.4 Impact of Sound Volume
In this section, we study how the sound volume affects the performance of Spy-Phone.
By calling the getStreamVolume(AudioManager.STREAM_MUSIC) for the AudioManager
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Table 2.4: Statistical Analysis of the Speaker Identification Result.
Nexus 6P Training Galaxy S8 Training
Nexus 6P Testing 90.52% 83.26%
Galaxy S8 Testing 84.39% 90.48%













Figure 2.16: Impact of Sound Volume.
class, the Google Nexus 6P device supports 15 volume levels. All these volume levels are
tested and the results are shown in Figure 2.16. The accuracy goes up when the volume
goes up. The classification accuracy is above 60% when the volume is set to be level 10 or
larger, and the accuracy goes to above 90% when the volume is set to be the highest two
levels. Even when the volume is low, the average accuracy is about 30-40%, over 3 times
higher than the random guess accuracy of 9.09%.
2.6.5 Impact of Surrounding Environment
In this section, we test how background noises like real human talking influence the
classification accuracy. When the smartphone speakers are playing sounds, a real person
talks 20 cm away from the smartphone, with a similar volume. The result is shown in
Figure 2.17, the overall accuracy for all classes is about 60%. Since Spy-Phone still works
in this experiment, it is an evidence that motion sensors are more sensitive to the built-
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Figure 2.17: Impact of Surrounding Environment.
Figure 2.18: Testing Setup.
in speakers than other sound sources that transmit signals through the air. It is worth
mentioning that the performance of Spy-Phone can be further improved if more training
data is added. At this time, all training data are collected in a quiet environment, so directly
feeding an input data from a noisy environment decreases the accuracy from 91% to 60%.
Adding data from various environments, however, is expected to increase the robustness of
the system and therefore a future research direction.
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To further test the impact of noises, we use a babble noise file and play the noise with
different volumes. We control the sound pressure level received by the target phone to 55dB
(quiet urban street), 60dB (normal conversation), and 65 dB (busy street). The results are
shown in Figure 2.20.
2.6.6 Impact of User Mobility















Figure 2.19: Impact of User Mobility.
All previous experiments are conducted when the smartphone is placed on a desk,
without being touched or moved during the data collection stage. As illustrated in Figure 2.9,
user movements are regarded as noises. Fortunately, since user movement is very slow and
is unlikely to generate signals as high as 50 Hz. Thus, we can apply a high pass filter to
mitigate the noise. In Figure 2.9c, we see noises are removed after the filter. In this section,
we validate the performance of Spy-Phone with the presence of user mobility.
We conduct two experiments: the walking scenario and the driving scenario. The users
put the phone in their pockets while playing the sounds using the speakers. The results
are shown in Figure 2.21. The accuracy for the walking scenario is 83.94% and that of
driving scenario is 73.34%. The accuracy of the driving scenario is relatively lower because












































































































































































Accuracy: 88.87% Error Rate: 11.13%
Precision: 88.87% True Positive Rate: 89.20%
F1 Score: 0.889 True Negative Rate: 98.89%
False Negative: 10.80% False Positive Rate: 1.11%









































































































































































Accuracy: 85.48% Error Rate: 14.52%
Precision: 85.49% True Positive Rate: 86.16%
F1 Score: 0.855 True Negative Rate: 98.55%
False Negative: 13.84% False Positive Rate: 1.45%









































































































































































Accuracy: 77.50% Error Rate: 22.50%
Precision: 77.47% True Positive Rate: 77.61%
F1 Score: 0.773 True Negative Rate: 97.76%
False Negative: 22.39% False Positive Rate: 2.24%
(c) Noisy Street (65 dB noise)
Figure 2.20: The Impact of Surrounding Environments: Quiet Street, Normal Conversation, and Noisy Street. Note that the










































































































































































Accuracy: 83.94% Error Rate: 16.06%
Precision: 83.94% True Positive Rate: 84.05%
F1 Score: 0.839 True Negative Rate: 98.39%









































































































































































Accuracy: 73.34% Error Rate: 26.66%
Precision: 73.34% True Positive Rate: 73.59%
F1 Score: 0.733 True Negative Rate: 97.34%
False Negative Rate: 26.41% False Positive Rate: 2.66%
Figure 2.21: Accuracy in the walking (left) and driving (right) scenario. The machine learning model trained in the stable
environment is directly used to predict the testing data collected when user is walking or driving.
Moreover, we conduct an experiment in the extreme case that the user holds the phone
in the hand and keeps moving it. The results are plotted in Figure 2.19, the average accuracy
can still achieve 45%.
2.7 Defenses
To defend against the Man-in-the-Phone attack, the smartphone user can adopt the
hardware-based defenses or the software-based defenses if supported by the smartphone’s
operating systems.
2.7.1 Hardware-based Defenses
The easiest way to defend the Man-in-the-Phone attack is to not use smartphone’s built-
in speakers. Instead, a user can use headphones or other wireless connected loudspeakers.
As long as there is no direct contact between the speakers and the motion sensors, the attack
is defended [5]. In fact, as shown in Section 2.6.4, with lower volume setting, the Man-in-
the-Phone attack can also be largely impeded. Though such hardware-based defenses may
cause inconvenience to the user, their security and privacy can be protected.
2.7.2 Software-based Defenses
The software-based defenses are better sensor management by smartphones’ operating
systems (OS). For example, the OS should treat the permissions to motion sensors as
dangerous permissions and require users to grant permissions at installation time.
Moreover, the OS should keep monitoring the sensor usage such as when the sensors are
used, whether they are used in background, and what sampling rate is required by the
application.
Though there has been some research in designing better sensor management
systems [102], the Man-in-the-Phone attack may still be a big threat for at least three
years. This is because the smartphone users may not or can not upgrade to the
newly-released OS in a timely manner. Indeed, by the end of May 7, 2019, more than half
the Android devices are still using OS released three years ago 8. Therefore, three years
8More than half the Android devices are still using OS as old as Android Nougat, which was released in
2016 according to Android Dashboards (https://developer.android.com/about/dashboards)
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later, there is a large chance that more than half the devices are still using the OS released
so far. Since current Android OS cannot defend the SpyPhone system, those devices are
vulnerable to the Man-in-the-Phone attack. However, if smartphone users know the
importance of the update and cares about their security and privacy, the adoption speed
may increase. Note that there is a huge lag between Google and the manufacturers such as
Samsung and Huawei. Even Google release the security updates quickly enough, the
manufacturer may release them too late.
2.8 Related Work
2.8.1 Inferring Information From Smartphone Motion Sensors
In recent years, much attention has been paid to inferring private information through
motion sensors in the literature. A typical side-channel attack is keystrokes inference on
smartphones through motion sensors [83, 75]. The general idea of these attacks is that when
typing on different locations on a screen, the keystrokes cause distinct vibrations or rotations.
In addition, Wang et al. [122] proposed to track the movement of the wrist to infer what the
user has typed. Similarly, a practical attack has been shown in [121], which infers a user’s
personal PIN sequence by exploiting wearable devices. The feasibility of inferring user’s
location information using motion sensors instead of GPS data has been shown in [63, 42].
Bojinov et al. [10] demonstrated that motion sensors can be used as device fingerprint to
uniquely identify a device. This motion sensor-based device fingerprint was further utilized
by [24] to track a user across multiple visits to websites. In [61], Lee et al. proposed to
use motion sensors to infer users’ handwritten patterns. Huang et al. [48] implemented a
reliable liveness detection system called Breathlive, which is based on the inherent correlation
between sounds and chest motion caused by deep breathing. Roy et al. [95] demonstrated
the possibility of communication through motion sensors by modulating the vibration motor
and decoding through accelerometers. Recent works on activity recognition using motion
sensors are presented in [100, 123]. In addition, a detailed survey of works on sensor-based
threats for smart devices can be found in [103, 23]. Note that we only list related works
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using smartphone motion sensors, but not works using standalone sensors. This is because
smartphone motion sensors can only report readings at a low frequency, but standalone
accelerometers or gyroscopes can record signals with frequencies as high as 10 KHz. Some
special models of piezoelectric accelerometers can even measure 1 MHz signals.
2.8.2 Eavesdropping Sound Signals By Non-Acoustic Sensors
Recent studies have shown that sound signals can be eavesdropped through non-acoustic
sensors instead of microphones. Among these side-channel attacks, MEMS motion sensors
are widely used since motion sensors are prone to acoustic signals. Michalevsky et al. [74]
found that the MEMS gyro sensors are able to pick up air vibrations from sound. They
proposed GyroPhone, a new threat which uses gyroscope on smartphone to intercept human
speech. Zhang et al. [137] proposed to utilize accelerometer for hotword detection to reduce
power consumption. In addition, Anand et al. [5] also demonstrated that it is possible
to eavesdrop speech signals in certain scenarios by using inertial sensors in a smartphone.
Han et al. [41] proposed to combine multiple signals from non-acoustic sensors to create
a higher sample rate signal for speech reconstruction. Hawley et al. [43] proposed to use
sensors on smartphone to visualize the properties of sound directivity, interference and other
acoustical phenomena. Recently, other techniques have been proposed to eavesdrop sound
signals besides motion sensors. Roy et al. [96] have shown that the vibration motor can
be used as microphone since the vibrating mass inside the motor responds to air vibrations
from nearby sounds. Davis et al. [25] used a high speed camera to retrieve digital audio by
capturing the vibration of objects near the sound source. Similarly, Fuse et al. [36] found
that a better sound can be obtained by trying to recover the sound based on the vibration
direction of the object. Kwong et al. [56] demonstrated that the mechanical components in




In this work, we introduced the Man-in-the-Phone attack and implemented it in the
Spy-Phone system. This Spy-Phone system achieves user-independent attacking by
compressed sensing and long short-time memory networks. The average accuracies for
classifying user activity, speaker gender, speaker identity, and speech content are 81%,
93%, 98%, and up to 90%, respectively. Future work is to improve the robustness of
Spy-Phone by adding more training data collected in noisy environment and in moving




USING GESTURES IN THE AIR
In this chapter, we propose a new authentication method for smartphones. During the
authentication period, the smartphone’s built-in speaker transmits ultrasound signals
continuously and the user draws a user-defined gesture in the air. Then the signals
reflected from the user’s hand are fed into a pre-trained machine learning model to get the
authentication results. The key idea is to use in-phase (I) and quadrature(Q) components
to represent hand movements, which not only provides high accuracy but also decrease the
data size. Moreover, to calculate I/Q components, we choose to use cascaded
integrator–comb (CIC) filters, which utilizes only delay and addition and subtraction.
Since CIC filters require no multiplication operations, it does not introduce high
computational overhead and therefore can be implemented on most smartphones.
Experiments of the proposed Ultra-Unlock system on Google Nexus 6P devices show that
the system can identify 3 different gestures with an average accuracy of 90.89% and
identify 6 people with an average accuracy of 78.47%. We also propose six directions to
further increase the accuracy, as a guide for future work.
3.1 Introduction
Smartphones have been an indispensable part of our daily lives, and most of them still
require a password or pin code if you want to unlock them. However, in today’s busy
world, typing those passwords is a waste of time. As a result, biometric security systems
have been on the rise and many smartphones adopt the fingerprints to do authentication.
The problem is, if your hands are dirty or wet, the smartphone just won’t let you in!
Researchers have developed a lot more other authentication methods, such as the face ID
or smart card, but these methods all require special hardware. Moreover, if users wear face
masks, air-purifying respirators, goggles, or face shields, as during the COVID-19
pandemic, authentication methods such as face ID do not work anymore. Some may argue
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that users can use voice authentication systems instead. However, the security of voice
authentication systems is relatively low due to the replay attack and many users don’t use
the method in public because it’s uncomfortable talking to their phones with others
around.
Therefore, we propose a new authentication method called Ultra-Unlock, which provides
a silent, quick, and smooth user experience for unlocking without your hands touch the
phone. It utilizes the speakers and microphones and conducts the authentication through
processing ultrasound signals. The smartphone has the ability to reconstruct the user’s
hand movement and determine whether it belongs to a legitimate user or not. Following the
classification method proposed in [120], our method is a combination of knowledge-based
method and identity-based method, since the user must have the knowledge of what the
shape he should draw and meet the biometric features of how to draw the shape.
3.2 Related Works
Our Ultra-Unlock system has three important building blocks: 1) smartphones can
generate and process ultrasound signals 2) the ultrasound signals are sensitive to hand
movements 3) hand movements are feasible features for user authentication. There have
been many researches on each building block.
First, commercial on-the-shelf smartphones can transmit and receive ultrasound
signals, though the band is very narrow. Smartphones nowadays are mostly equipped with
speakers and microphones whose highest sample rate is either 44100 Hz or 48000 Hz 1.
According to the Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem, in order to sample a signal of
frequency f , a sufficient sample rate would be 2f . Then by the reverse, we know that
commercial smartphones can generate and record sounds whose frequencies are lower than
22050 Hz or 24000 Hz. Since the range of human hearing is generally considered to be 20
Hz - 20000 Hz, we conclude that smartphones are able to create and process ultrasounds in
the range of 20000 Hz - 22050 Hz or 20000 Hz - 24000 Hz.
1Some models support higher resolutions, for example, Samsung Galaxy S10 features 32-bit/384kHz Hi-Fi
playback
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Next, various algorithms have been developed to extract information on movements from
ultrasound signals. Graham et al. [37] proposed a smartphone sonar system that calculates
distances by measuring the elapsed time between the initial pulse of the ultrasound signal
and its reflection. They were able to measure the distances of objects accurately with an
error bound of 12 cm. Liu et al. [64] designed the Guoguo algorithm and ecosystem to realize
the smartphone-based fined-grained indoor localization with average localization accuracy
being about 6 cm - 15 cm in typical indoor environments. Nandakumar et al. [77] presented
a sub-centimeter level smartphone tracking system which adopts a modulation technique
commonly used in wireless communication called orthogonal frequency division multiplexing.
Their FingerIO system can achieve 2D finger tracking with an average accuracy of 8 mm.
Mao et al. [68] developed a high-precision acoustic tracker system by sending a distributed
frequency modulated continuous waveform (FMCW). They also designed an optimization
framework that combines FMCW estimation with Doppler shifts and inertial measurement
unit measurements to enhance the accuracy to be 8 mm - 9 mm in 3D space. Wang et
al. [125] proposed the LLAP system which measures the phase changes of the sound signals
caused by hand/finger movements and then converts the phase changes into the distance of
the movement. They increase the tracking accuracy to 7 mm in 2D space. Later on, Yun
et al. [133] took into account multipath propagation and designed a novel acoustic-based
device-free tracking system, called Strata, which outperforms FingerIO and LLAP. In 2018,
Sun et al. [108] improved LLAP and the new system can capture finger movements with an
accuracy of 3.59 mm.
Lastly, hand movements have intra-person similarity and inter-person difference.
Therefore, it can be used for user authentication. works of literature on finger/hand
movement based authentication methods. Niu et al. [80] proposed using finger gestures
with taps to the screen to conduct authentication. They tested the recall and forgery of
gesture authentication and show, using dynamic time warping, that even simple gestures
are repeatable by their creators yet hard to forge by attackers when taps are added. Hong
et al. [46] proposed Waving Authentication (WA) which is a motion gesture authentication
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system based on accelerometers. WA utilizes eight distinguishing features hiding in the
acceleration traces of motion gestures and exploits a one-class Support Vector Machine
(SVM) for classification. Yang et al. [132] studied how free-form gestures perform in the
wild. Their 91 participants generated 347 text passwords and 345 gesture passwords with
2002 completed log-in tasks. They found that, with gesture passwords, participants
generated new passwords and authenticated faster with comparable memorability while
being more willing to retry.
However, all the above gestures are collected from the smartphone touch screens. There
is no existing paper on how to authenticate users based on their hand movements in the air.
3.3 Background
The general idea of Ultra-Unlock is to treat hand movements as a special I/Q
modulation on a signal with fixed frequency. Different users have different hand
movements, and modulate the same carrier signal in different ways. After collecting the
modulated signals, machine learning techniques can be used for modulation classification.
If the modulation is classified to be the hand movement of a legitimate user, the
smartphone will accept that user.
In this section, we first provide the necessary background on I/Q data, and then discuss
the relationship between hand movements and I/Q modulation.
3.3.1 I/Q components and I/Q modulation
The most common way to represent a wave is to use a series of samples of the momentary
amplitude of the signal. However, this method cannot differentiate between a positive or
negative frequency since they both generate the same curve, for example, cos(x) = cos(−x).
This becomes a problem working with the signal. Mixing (multiplying) two signals and
it’ll cause multiple solutions due to the uncertainty of the sign. A better way is using
I/Q data and representing a wave using in-phase and quadrature components. As shown
in Figure 3.1, the signal is plotted in three dimensions. The in-phase component and the





























































































Figure 3.1: In-phase and Quadrature Components from Different View Angles
changes in amplitude and phase of a sine wave. The in-phase component indicates the
“real” signal. For two signals of a positive and a negative frequency, they will have the
same in-phase component but reversed quadrature components. Moreover, if the signal is
viewed along the time axis, the spiral winds counter-clockwise, which means the frequency
is positive. The radius of each circle indicates the peak amplitude of the signal.
Mathematically, for a complex signal Aeiϕ where i is the imaginary unit, the in-phase
component is I = A cos(ϕ) and the quadrature component is Q = A sin(ϕ). That is,




I2 +Q2 and ϕ = tan−1
Q
I
In electrical engineering, there are three basic ways to modulate a waveform: Amplitude
Modulation (AM), Frequency Modulation (FM) and Phase Modulation (PM). All of them
can be achieved by I/Q modulation. Suppose the carrier’s frequency is f , I/Q modulation
is to solve the following equation:
ModulatedSignal = I · cos(2πft) +Q · sin(2πft).
To decode the baseband signal, signal multiplication and low pass filters are needed:
I = lowpass(ModulatedSignal · cos(2πft));
Q = lowpass(ModulatedSignal · sin(2πft)).
3.3.2 Hand Movements and I/Q Data
Now we show how hand movements can be regarded as I/Q modulation. As shown






peak amplitude of A = 1, the frequency f = 20, 000 Hz, and the sampling frequency of
fs = 44, 100 Hz. At the time tp =
n
fs
, the sound propagation path p decreases by ∆p due to









where 2A′p is the new amplitude, the term 2π
∆p
λ
comes from the phase lag caused by the
propagation delay of ∆p
λ
and λ is the wavelength of the ultrasound. In our system, λ =
c/f = 343 m/s
20,000 Hz
= 1.72 cm, where c is the speed of sound. The last term θp is the initial
phase, which is caused by the hardware delay and phase inversion due to reflection [125]. In
conclusion, the existence of hand movement changes the amplitude and phase of the original
signal. Since I/Q data shows the changes in amplitude and phase of a waveform, we use I/Q





















Figure 3.2: Sound Propagation Paths on a Smartphone.




































































is a signal of frequency 2f and

























































































Combining these two components as the real and imaginary part of a complex signal,
we have the complex baseband as follows:
BasebandSignal = A′pe
−i(2π∆pλ +θp).






, which changes by 2π when ∆p
changes by the amount of sound wavelength λ = 1.72 cm. In other words, a small movement
of a few millimeters will significantly change the phase of the received sound wave.
In conclusion, if there is no hand movement at the time tp, i.e., ∆p = 0, then Ip and Qp
will be stable. Otherwise, the I/Q components vary like sinusoids.
3.4 System Design
We now provide the system design of Ultra-Unlock. The system is built based on
Android operating system and tested by Google Nexus 6P smartphones.
In Ultra-Unlock, the smartphone speaker would send continuous ultrasound waves
with frequency f = 20, 000 Hz. The signals are encoded with 16-bit pulse-code modulation
(PCM). Then we use the smartphone microphones to catch the reflective signals of the
ultrasound simultaneously. Though the smartphone has more than one microphone to
support stereo recording, our system only needs one channel to calculate the I/Q data. As











. After converting the data to the fixed-point data type
with a word length of 16 and a fraction length of 15, we feed the data through Cascaded
Integrator-Comb (CIC) filters to remove high-frequency components and decimate the
signal. To achieve better computational efficiency, we do not use a frequency compensate
































































Figure 3.3: Android App design for Ultra-Unlock
CIC filter is an optimized class of finite impulse response (FIR) filter combined with
a decimator. It provides a linear phase response and utilizing only delay and addition and
subtraction. In other words, it requires no multiplication operations and therefore has less
computational costs, which is more suitable to be implemented on smartphones. Our CIC
filter is a two-section filter (two integrator sand two comb filters) with a decimate ratio of 15
and a differential delay of 16. Figure 3.4 shows the frequency response of the CIC filter. We
select the parameters so that the first and second zeros of the filter appear at 183 Hz and
366 Hz. The pass-band of the CIC filter is 0 - 100 Hz, which corresponds to the movements
with a speed lower than 0.86 m/s when the wavelength is 1.72 cm.


































Filter #1: Quantized Magnitude
Filter #1: Reference Magnitude
Filter #1: Quantized Phase
Filter #1: Reference Phase
Figure 3.4: Frequency Response of the Cascaded Integrator-Comb Filter.
As discussed in Section 3.3, the in-phase and quadrature components are a good
indicator of the path changes. In detail, the I/Q waveforms remain static when the hand is
not moving and vary like sinusoids when the hand moves. Different hand movements
generate different sinusoids, which can be trained by a Long Short-Term Memory LSTM
network for classification. We use the same LSTM network as discussed in Section 2.4.5,
but with different parameter settings.
56
3.5 Experiment Results
We implemented the Ultra-Unlock on a Google Nexus 6P smartphone and first validate
the correlation between hand movements and I/Q data. Three screenshots are shown in
Figure 3.5. The yellow lines are the quadrature components and the blue lines are the in-
phase components. The x-axis is the indexes of samples. In each figure, 256 samples are
shown, which spans in the time period of 256/294 × 4410/44100 = 0.087 s. (256 is the
buffer size of the array plot, 294 is the sampling rate after CIC filter, 4410 is the frame size
of audio recorder, and 44100 is the sampling frequency of the carrier signal.) As shown in
Figure 3.5, when there is no hand movement, the I/Q data are stable. When the user puts
one hand parallel to the phone and moves towards the screen, then I/Q value become regular
sinusoids. If the user conducts an open-close gesture (make a loose fist and then spread all
fingers wide), the I/Q data are still sinusoidal but they become less regular. Note that these
screenshots cannot represent the whole changes caused by hand movement, since a whole
gesture usually costs about 0.3-1 second, which spans 3 to 12 frames.
Figure 3.6 shows the I/Q data collected when the user moves the hand down and up.
The phase of the I/Q data reverses at 0.24 seconds, which indicates the direction change of
the hand movement. Moreover, we noticed that there are 4 full peaks and valleys before the
hand changes the direction. Combining with the fact that the wavelength of the signal is
1.72 cm, we know that the path changes 1.72× 4 = 6.88 cm. In other words, in 0.2 seconds,
the user moves one hand towards the smartphone by 3.44 cm. Note that this distance is
calculated based on the assumption that the user’s hand moves in one dimension. However,
in reality, the user’s hands move in 3D. Fortunately, smartphones nowadays are usually
equipped with more than two speakers and more than two microphones, which enable Ultra-
Unlock to locate user hands in 3D. Due to the time limit, the current Ultra-UnlockApp does
not have this feature yet. In future work, we will implement this feature, as more dimensions
of features will also increase the accuracy of user authentication.
Our current machine learning modal only has two dimensions of features: the amplitude
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(a) No Hand Movement
(b) One Hand Moving Towards the Phone
(c) Open-Close Gesture
Figure 3.5: Screenshots of the UltraUnlockApp
and the phase calculated from I/Q data. We tested our Ultra-Unlock system on 6 people
and 3 gestures. Each user is asked to perform the same gestures for 20 times where we use
half of them to train the LSTM network and the other half to test the model. The three
































































































Figure 3.6: I/Q Components from Different View Angles. The hand first move dowards
towards the smartphone, then move upwards.
6 people are 3 females and 3 males aging 20-30.
The classification results of 3 gestures are shown in Figure 3.8. The average accuracy is
90.89% and the up-down gesture has the least false negative rate. The classification results
of user identification are shown in Figure 3.9, where the average accuracy is 78.47%. Note
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Up-Down Open-Close Eight-In-The-Air










































Accuracy: 90.89% Error Rate: 9.11%
Precision: 92.04% True Positive Rate (Sensitivity/Recall): 91.00%
F1 Score: 0.915 True Negative Rate (Specificity): 95.10%
False Negative Rate: 9.00% False Positive Rate: 4.90%
Figure 3.8: The Confusion Matrix of the Gesture Classification Result.
that the true negative rate (specificity) is 95.68% and the false positive rate is 4.32%, which
means there is a higher chance that a legitimate user would be rejected than the chance that
an attacker gets accepted by the phone. Though such a setting will provide more security
to the smartphone, the overall accuracy is not satisfactory. There are at least three ways to
further increase it, and we leave it for future work:
• Utilizing more speakers and microphones. In this chapter, we only utilizing one
microphone and one speaker on the smartphone. However, most smartphones










































































Accuracy: 78.47% Error Rate: 21.53%
Precision: 77.74% True Positive Rate (Sensitivity/Recall): 77.69%
F1 Score: 0.775 True Negative Rate (Specificity): 95.68%
False Negative Rate: 22.31% False Positive Rate: 4.32%
Figure 3.9: The Confusion Matrix of the User Classification Result.
pair of microphones and a pair of speakers. If all sensors and transmitters are
adopted, we will increase the signal channel from 1 × 1 to 2 × 2. If doing so,
Ultra-Unlock will be able to localize the hand in three dimensions and the feature
vectors will increase from 2 to 8. Intuitively, the performance of the classification
model will be improved with more features. However, there would also be many
challenges to achieve upgrades. For example, we need to propose effective and
efficient algorithms to deal with the interference caused by simultaneous signals.
• Using multiple-frequency signals as the carrier instead of single-frequency signals. The
current Ultra-Unlock system suffers from the multipath effect. Ideally, when there is
no hand movement, the I/Q data remain the same. However, signals received from
different paths can be regarded as signals reflected by a moving hand, which causes
the I/Q data to be changed too. To mitigate the multipath effect, we could use signals
with multiple frequencies as the carrier. Since those signals have different frequencies
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and thus have different wavelengths, they can differentiate between multiple stable
paths and one varying path. The challenge is how to select those frequencies and how
to set corresponding parameters for the CIC filters.
• Extracting more information from I/Q data instead of directly feeding them to LSTM
networks. In this chapter, we feed the raw I/Q data to the machine learning model
for classification. However, we could extract more information from them. With
the aforementioned two improvement methods implemented, I/Q data can be used to
reconstruct the hand trajectories in three dimensions. We can use the trajectories for
user classification. Moreover, we could also extract time and frequency features from
the I/Q data. Some commonly used temporal features include mean, min, max, RMS,
ZCR, skewness, kurtosis, and peak count. Some commonly used frequency features
include spectral centroid, spectral spread, spectral skewness, spectral kurtosis, spectral
flatness, spectral irregularity, spectral entropy, spectral roll-off, spectral brightness,
spectral RMS, and spectral roughness. All these features can be implemented and
tested to achieve higher accuracy. In addition, Ultra-Unlock now treats the hand and
the fingers as an integrated part, reconstructing the gestures from hand level to finger
level may improve the gesture recognition and user authentication performance.
• Implementing the system fully on smartphones. The current Ultra-UnlockApp only
serves as a data collection app, the training and predicting procedures are done in a
MacBook Pro with 2.6 GHz 6-Core Intel Core i7 and 16 GB 2400 MHz DDR4. In
future work, we will move this classification part to smartphones and evaluate the
latency.
• Evaluating the performance of Ultra-Unlock under different settings. Many factors
may have an impact on the classification result. In the current experiments, we just
showed the volunteers how to perform hand movements in the air. But we didn’t
restrict the users to perform the gestures in certain spaces. The volunteers were free to
choose their own speeds to draw the gestures and the sizes of the gestures are flexible
too. In future work, we plan to test the influence of such factors. Moreover, current
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experiments are conducted in a relatively stable environment. There are no other
moving objects within 1 meter of the testing smartphone. How to remove the noises
from background movements is another challenge to overcome.
• Recruiting more volunteers and testing more gestures. In this chapter, Ultra-Unlock
is tested over a very limited dataset. This is because of the limited time and the
difficulties of recruiting volunteers during the pandemic. To popularize this new
authentication method, a lot more volunteers and gestures are required.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we demonstrated how to use I/Q data to represent hand movements
and show the potential of using the I/Q data for smartphone authentication. Experiments
showed that the proposed Ultra-Unlock system can achieve gesture recognition with accuracy
of 90.8% and user identification with accuracy of 78.47%. This Ultra-Unlock system is till
at its early stage and we pointed out six directions to improve it in future work.
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CHAPTER 4
MOVO: A SPOOF-PROOF VOICE AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM FOR SMARTPHONES
Voice authentication is drawing increasing attention and becomes an attractive
alternative to passwords for mobile authentication. However, existing voice authentication
systems are vulnerable to various spoofing attacks. For example, attackers can record the
victim’s voice in person or online, then replay the recording and access the victim’s devices
illegally. We propose MoVo, a spoof-proof voice authentication system which not only
differentiates different people but also differentiates live people and electronic devices. The
idea is to utilize the self demodulation effect and acoustic attenuation effect when sound
signals are transmitted through human bodies. Our system can defend the smartphone’s
voice authentication system against 3 attack scenarios, each contains 3 attack types.
Experiments show MoVo can identify different users with 92.98% accuracy and defend
voice spoofing attacks with 90.43% accuracy.
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 The Popularity of Voice Authentication on Smartphones
According to reports issued by several market research firms, the total number of
smartphone users worldwide is over 3 billion this year and is expected to reach 3.9 billion
by 2023 [79, 72]. The rapidly increasing use of smartphones is actuating the need for better
protection. User authentication on smartphones has thus been an important area of
research.
Survey papers [119, 66, 99] have compared the strengths and limitations of existing
authentication methods, from knowledge-based methods such as PIN or password to identity-
based methods such as fingerprint and face. PIN and password are the most widely used
authentication methods. However, when the users have wet or dirty fingers or wear gloves on
their hands, such touchscreen-related authentication methods will not work. The fingerprint
authentication system suffers from the same problem. As for face recognition, it stops
working when users are wearing moisturizing mask sheets or other head wearables such as ski
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goggles. In the aforementioned scenarios, voice authentication provides better convenience
to users and thus a great alternative.
In fact, voice authentication has been adopted in a wide variety of smartphone
applications. For example, Android users can say “Ok Google” to access Google assistant
directly [30]; the Tencent company adopts Voiceprint to provide securely, faster and easier
log-ins to WeChat accounts, available on both Android and iOS platforms [128]; the
BioTrust uses voice biometrics to allow elderly and sick people to order prescription
medication without the need to leave the house [9]; the Citi bank uses voice biometrics
authentication system for phone banking, which reduces the number of tedious security
questions [21]; the LMH Blockchain adopts Say-Tec [97] to authenticate, validate, process,
and protect users’ blockchain assets and cryptocurrency by voice [65]. Based on a market
research report published in 2019 [70], the speech and voice recognition market is expected
to grow from $7.5 billion as in 2018 to $21.5 billion by 2024.
4.1.2 Voice Spoofing Attacks
In spite of the increasing trend for the adoption of voice authentication, this method is
not unassailable, just like other methods. Researchers have found that voice authentication
systems are vulnerable to the following four attacks [130]: impersonation attack, replay
attack, speech synthesis, and voice conversion.
• Impersonation attack refers to the scenario where an attacker tries to mimic the
legitimate user’s voice without any computer-aided technology.
• Replay attack refers to the scenario where an attacker replays a pre-recorded speech
sample collected from the legitimate user.
• Speech synthesis refers to the scenario where an attacker generates intelligible, natural-
sounding artificial speech from text.
• Voice conversion refers to the scenario where an attacker converts his speech signals to
an artificial speech signal which has similar timbre and prosody to that of the legitimate
user.
Among the four voice-spoofing attacks, the impersonation attack is the hardest to
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perform, as Lau et al. [59] have found that successful impersonation attacks require
professional impersonators or attackers whose natural voices already similar to the
legitimate user’s. Even with professional mimicry artists or linguists, the existing voice
authentication system is hard to fool [69].
The other three types of attacks, however, are much easier to be conducted. Because
attackers could get the victim’s voice recordings. It is common to see people use voice
assistants (Alexa, Bixby, Cortana, Google, Siri, etc.) in public. Attackers can also record
the victim’s voice on the site or remotely. Moreover, people nowadays not only post text or
image to social media sites (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube, etc.), but also upload
videos containing their voices. Attackers can extract the victim’s voice from those online
videos and build the speech profile of each victim. With a properly built speech profile,
attackers are able to use the victim’s voice to say just about anything, using algorithms such
as vector quantization [1], probabilistic transform [107], or neural networks [27]. Such voice
generation techniques are well-established. As evidence, celebrity voice changer websites
or apps could generate natural-sounding speeches the same as those directly from Obama,
Trump, Stephen Hawking, Bruce Wayne, and many more.
Some may argue that large training data is required to build the victim’s speech profile.
However, for the purpose of attacking, the attackers may only need to use small training
data to generate the hot-word or the activation phrase. There is no need to generate every
possible sentence. This is because most voice authentication systems adopt the one-time
authentication scheme to grant access, instead of a continuous authentication scheme [34].
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(a) Enabling Voice setting. (b) Voice Match warning. (c) Information leakage when
the phone is locked.
Figure 4.1: Screenshots about Voice Match on Google Nexus 6P.
For example, on a Google Nexus 6P smartphone running Android 8.1.0, it provides
the Voice Match feature which allows users to access their personal data by voices1. If an
attacker replays the victim’s “Ok Google” utterance, followed by “show me my emails” in
his own voice (not the victim’s), the Android system will regard him as the legitimate user
(false acceptance) and show the emails. Because the authentication only checks the hot-
word. Once the access is granted, any command coming after will be executed, no matter
in whose voice.
Fig. 4.1 are the screenshots when the aforementioned replay attack is tested in reality.
Fig. 4.1a shows how to enable the Voice Match function. Fig. 4.1b indicates the system is
aware of its vulnerability to impersonation attack and replay attack. Fig. 4.1c
demonstrates the attacker could steal sensitive information without unlocking the phone
(the closed padlock at the top). In this test, the leaked information is the emails from the
Gmail Inbox, which include the credit card information sent from the victim’s mom and a
secret from his friend. Recall that to conduct this attack successfully, all the thing the
attacker need is a short recording of “Ok Google” in the victim’s voice, but the harm can
be huge.
4.1.3 Liveness Detection
Voice spoofing attacks drastically degrade the performance of standard voice
authentication systems by increasing false acceptance rates [126, 32], leading to severe
security and privacy issues. Fortunately, researchers have done extensive research on
defending these attacks and building spoof-proof voice authentication systems.
1When the Voice Match feature first came out, Android users could fully unlock the phone with this function.
However, starts from January 2019, Google removes the ability for Voice Match to act as a password due to
security concerns. The previous “Unlock with Voice Match” is replaced to only provide “personal results”.
Such results come from emails, calendar entries, contacts, etc., and are still sensitive information.
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Table 4.1: Related Work on Liveness Detection








Detecting lip movements using
cameras.




Poss et al. [88] Using neural tree networks to
determine unique aspects of
utterances and Hidden Markov
Models to classify them.




Testing whether an incoming
recording shares the same
originating utterance as any of N
stored recordings.






Detecting noises and spectrum
changes caused by far-field
microphone and loudspeakers.
Limits the replay attackers to use
far-field microphones.
91%-100% ✓ ✓
Wang et al. [126] Detecting channel pattern noise
caused by microphone and
loudspeakers.






voice variation to Nuance
VocalPassword [22].






VoiceLive: Measuring the time-
difference-of-arrival changes of
a sequence of phoneme sounds
to the two microphones of the
phone.
Requires at least two high-quality









Chen et al. [18] Detecting the magnetic field
emitted from loudspeakers.
Requires the user to move the
smartphone with the predefined






Dopler shifts in signals caused by
users’ articulatory gestures when
speaking.
Requires high quality
microphones and needs a longer
computation time.
99% ✓ ✓
Feng et al. [34] VAuth: Utilizing the
instantaneous consistency
of the entire signal from
the accelerometer and the
microphone.
Requires the user to wear high-
sampling-rate accelerometers on
the facial, throat, or sternum
areas.
97% ✗ ✓
Huang et al. [48] BreathLive: Utilizing chest
movement when making deep
breaths
The sound is deep breath
sound instead of human speech;
Stethoscope is needed.
91%/94%/96% ✗ ✓
Ment et al. [73] WiVo: Using channal state
information (CSI) from WiFi
signals to detect mouth
movement
Requires WiFi antennas to
collect the CSI info; the distance
between antennas and human is
short (20cm).
99% ✗ ✓
As mentioned in Section 4.1.2, the threat of impersonation attack is much less than
that of the other three attacks, so impersonation attack is not a research focus. For replay
attack, speech synthesis, and voice conversion, researchers have noticed that they have one
thing in common – the attacking sound is played by an electronic speaker2 rather than
spoken by a real person. Therefore, if the authentication system can distinguish whether
the sound comes from a live person or an electronic device, it would be immune from those
voice spoofing attacks.
Existing liveness detection methods can be classified into two groups: detecting human-
related characteristics, or detecting device-related characteristics.
As listed in Table 4.1, there have been many research works on detecting
human-related characteristics. Girija Chetty and Michael Wagner [19] use cameras to
detect lip movements to detect liveness. However, their work requires camera access and
inherits the shortcomings of face authentication systems. Similarly, Meng et al. [73] tries to
detect mouth movement, but from channel state information from WiFi signals. Their
approach requires antenna pairs and the antennas are placed very close to humans (20cm),
which is not practical in reality. Poss et al. [88] use neural tree networks to determine
unique aspects of utterances and hidden Markov models to classify those features.
However, their work requires high computing power and long processing time. Wei Shang
and Maryhelen Stevenson [98] detect liveness by testing whether an incoming recording
shares the same originating utterance as any of previously-stored recordings. However, the
performance of their work is largely based on the previously-stored recordings. Aley-Raz et
al. [3] integrate intra-session voice variation to Nuance VocalPassword [22] for liveness
detection, but they require the user to cumbersomely repeat prompted sentences. Zhang et
al. [139] detect liveness by measuring the time-difference-of-arrival changes of a sequence of
phoneme sounds using the two microphones of the phone, which requires at least two
2In this and many other papers, attackers must play the attacking sound near the targeted smartphone. We
do not consider the scenario where sound files are directly injected. Because if attackers can inject sounds
to the system, the phone is already hacked. So there is no need to go through the voice authentication
procedure anymore.
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high-quality microphones in one smartphone. They also propose another work [138] to
detect users’ articulatory gestures when speaking. However, their work requires
high-quality microphones again and needs a longer computation time. Last but not least,
Feng et al. [34] utilizes the instantaneous consistency of the entire signal from the
accelerometer and the microphone for liveness detection. Their work is the most closely
related work to ours. However, their work requires the user to wear extra accelerometers
on the facial, throat, or sternum areas. Moreover, the accelerometer used in their work
requires a very high sampling rate (11,000 Hz), which cannot be supported by current
smartphones. In this work, we are only using a 400 Hz sampling rate for the accelerometer
and the gyroscope.
The aforementioned researchers detect the liveness of a user directly, but we can also
detect the liveness from the reverse side: detecting the presence of electronic devices. For
example, Jesús Villalba and Eduardo Lleida [118] detect noises and spectrum changes caused
by far-field microphones and loudspeakers. Wang et al. [126] detect channel pattern noise
caused by microphone and loudspeakers to identify replay attackers. However, they can only
deal with attackers who use low-quality microphones to record the legitimate user’s voices
or record the voice at a long distance. More recently, Chen et al. [18] detects the magnetic
field emitted from loudspeakers to identify attacks, but their work requires the user to move
the smartphone with the predefined trajectory around the sound source.
In conclusion, liveness detection methods either detect the presence of human beings
or the presence of electronic devices. Existing work has at least one of the following
shortcomings: 1) requiring special or extra devices; 2) requiring cumbersome user
interaction; 3) requiring high computing power or long processing time; 4) limited ability
in defending against spoofing attacks. Therefore, building a spoof-proof voice
authentication system is still an open problem.
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(a) Standing (b) Walking (c) Sitting
Figure 4.2: Authentication scenario of MoVo: holding the smartphone in contact with the
throat while authenticating. In this way, the smartphone captures the body-borne voice
vibrations through accelerometers and gyroscopes.
4.1.4 Overview of MoVo
In this thesis, we propose MoVo, a spoof-proof voice authentication system that using
motion sensors (accelerometers and gyroscopes) to measure voice.
As shown in Fig. 4.2, the user places the smartphone horizontally and makes sure the
phone is in close contact with his throat. Then the embedded motion sensors inside the phone
capture the conductive vibrations from vocal organs to the throat, and to the smartphone.
Afterward, the collected motion sensor data will be used for user authentication.
The intuition behind MoVo is the fact that human voice is essentially vibrations, so it
can be recorded by motion sensors [47, 84, 74]. Such motion-sensor data can be regarded as
downsampled microphone data, so it has the potentials to be used for voice authentication
too. Moreover, since the human body is a nonlinear medium similar to water [54], sounds go
through the body will be affected by acoustic attenuation [109] and self demodulation [8].
Such effects are human-only effects in that electronic devices are not water-like medium and
have totally different acoustic properties. Therefore, using motion data for authentication
can effectively differentiate live people from electronic devices, so that the system is protected
against various voice spoofing attacks.
In fact, there have been some recent studies that show the possibility of acquiring
acoustic signals by smartphones’ motion sensors. Michalevsky et al. [74] proposed Gyrophone
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in 2014. To the best of our knowledge, they are the first to use smartphone gyroscopes as low-
frequency microphones to listen to loudspeakers. Gyrophone can differentiate 11 digits3 with
65% accuracy based on a 10 people dataset. One year later, Zhang et al. [137] proposed
AccelWord, which utilizes accelerometers to classify hot-words such as “Okay Google” or
“Hi Galaxy” over other short phrases with 85% accuracy. AccelWord is also tested over
10 people. In 2018, however, Anald and Saxena [5] reproduced the aforementioned works
and overturned their conclusions. They argued that smartphone motion sensors can not be
affected by the speech signals transmitted through the air, no matter the sound source is a
loudspeaker or a live person. They reported that only when the speakers and the motion
sensors sharing a surface, the conductive vibrations will affect motion sensors’ readings.
Consistent with this newest research, MoVo asks the user to press the phone on his throat
so that the body-borne vibrations are recorded, not the air-borne sounds.
In summary, compared to previous works, the MoVo system have the following features:
• All-in-One: MoVo is an integral method which handles user authentication and
liveness detection at the same time.
• Applicable: MoVo works with current-off-the-shelf commercial smartphones. It does
not require any extra electronic device nor any special phone model, since the sensors
being used (motion sensors) are embedded on almost every smartphone.
• Easy: Except for pressing the smartphone on the user’s throat, MoVo does not ask
users to do extra movements other than an ordinary speaking behavior.
• Improved Robust: General voice authentication systems are sensitive to the
surrounding noises and their performance will degrade a lot in noisy environments.
MoVo, however, will not be affected. This is because smartphone’s motion sensors
measure the conductive vibrations and the affection from air-borne sounds is very
limited [5].
• Expandable: MoVo currently is a text-dependent voice authentication system that
detects certain hot-words. However, it can be expanded to a text-independent system
3One, two, . . . , nine and zero.
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since it is syllable-based (will be elaborated in Section 4.5).
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Voice Acoustics
Table 4.2: Maximum Sampling Rate of Smartphone Sensors
Device Release Year
Microphones’ Motion Sensors’
Sampling Rate Sampling Rate4
Samsung Galaxy S8 2017 192,000 Hz 500 Hz
Samsung Galaxy S7 2016 192,000 Hz 500 Hz
Google Nexus 6P 2015 48,000 Hz 400 Hz
LG Nexus 4 2012 48,000 Hz 200 Hz
The generation of human voice follows a source-filter model [33]. A speech signal can be
seen as a source signal (the glottal source at the larynx, or noise generated at a constriction
in the vocal tract), filtered with the resonances in the cavities of the vocal tract (tongue,
teeth, lips, velum, etc. modifying the sound spectrum over time). This theory has been
verified using 3-D printed models of two configurations of a vocal tract to generate sounds
to generate the vowels in the words “had” and “heard” [129].
A typical adult male will have a fundamental frequency (f0) of from 85 to 155 Hz, and
that of a typical adult female from 165 to 255 Hz [7, 111]. The frequencies of the first, the
second, and the i-th resonances are labeled as R1, R2, . . . Ri, and those of the spectral peaks
produced by these resonances are called formants, F1, F2, . . . Fi [112].
According to [58], English vowels are perceived largely according to the values of the
formants F1 and F2. The range of F1 is roughly from 270 to 860 Hz, and that of F2 from
840 to 2790 Hz [86]. As for English consonants, there are six categories: plosive/stop (e.g.
/p/), fricative (e.g. /f/), affricate (e.g. /dZ/), nasal (e.g. /m/), lateral (e.g. /l/), and
approximant (e.g. /r/). The frequencies of consonants vary a lot. The turbulence of /s/
4Data is partially from [71] and partially by calling the getMinDelay() function of
android.hardware.Sensor class. In fact, the sensors can sample at a higher rate, but the operating
systems restrict this rate in order to save power or for security concerns. For example, Google Nexus 6P
uses Bosch BMI160, whose sampling rate can be 1600 Hz., but the Android operating system only supports
up to 400 Hz on the phone.
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and /z/ occurs above 3500Hz, and reaches as high as 10,000 Hz, whereas /w/ has F1 from
250 to 450 Hz and F2 from 600 to 850 Hz [57].
By Nyquist–Shannon sampling theorem, to properly sample a signal contains no
frequency components higher than f Hz, the sampling rate must be at least 2f Hz
(Nyquist rate). In other words, a sampling rate of 400 Hz (motion sensors’ rate of Google
Nexus 6P as shown in Table 4.2) can only handle signals whose component frequencies are
below 200 Hz. Except for the part of the fundamentals, all F1 and F2 frequencies can not
be sensed. Therefore, it is impossible to perceive the signals with such a low sampling rate.
Fortunately, the objective of using motion data in MoVo is liveness detection and user
identification, not signal recovery. With some proper machine learning technology, the
undersampled data is informative enough to fulfill the purpose. The reason is, in signal
processing, there exists the aliasing phenomenon that high-frequency data will have aliases
at the low-frequency range, which indicates that the information is kept, though distorted.
4.2.2 Self Demodulation
Motion sensors not only capture the original sound data but also capture the modulated
signals. In detail, with self demodulation [8], the original sounds self interacts inside the








| fa - fb |
fa
Figure 4.3: Self Demodulation of Sound Signals When Transmitting Through the Human
Body.
Researchers have found that sounds with different frequencies that transmitted
through a nonlinear medium would interact with each other [87]. This interaction produces
new frequencies upon the combination of the sums and differences of the individual
frequency components by Khokhlov-Zabolotskaya-Kuznetsov(KZK) parabolic nonlinear
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wave equation [81].
Since the acoustic impedance of the human body is similar to that of water [54], the
self-demodulation would occur in the human body as shown in Fig. 4.3. The original sound
signals with frequency fa and fb would introduce two more signals with frequency fa + fb
and |fa− fb|. For different person, the original signals generated have different frequency, so
the low frequency signal |fa− fb| are different, which can be utilized for user authentication.
Moreover, note that electronic devices have different acoustic properties from that of the
human body. Therefore, those low-frequency signals can be used for liveness detection.
4.2.3 Acoustic Attenuation
Another effect that helps MoVo to do spoof-proof authentication is the acoustic
attenuation by the human body. It is known that the human voice is emitted by the vocal
organ and is a combination of mechanical vibrations with multiple amplitudes and different
frequencies. When a person speaks, the airflow from the lungs through the trachea
compresses the vocal cords causing vibrations to make sounds. The lung, trachea, and
vocal cord form a resonance chamber.
Suppose the length of vocal cords is d, the lung volume is V0, and the cross-sectional
area at the vocal cords is S. According to the polytropic process equation, when the airflow





(V0 − d · S)γ
,
where P0 is the normal atmospheric pressure, and γ is a coefficient about the air specific
heat. According to the definition of pressure, if the area at the vocal cords is Sv, the force
at the vocal cord is,
F0 = P1 · Sv =
Sv · P0 · V
γ
0
(V0 − d · S)γ
.
When the force is applied to the vocal cords, vertical displacement occurs. According to the
Newton’s second law of motion, we have,
F (t) = ma(t) + kx(t) + cv(t),
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where F (t) is the external force, v(t) is the speed, x(t) is the vertical displacement, c is the
damping coefficient, and k is the spring constant and m is the mass. The relation can further
be explained as,
F (t) = m
d2x(t)
dt2




The vibration during an airflow pass the vocal cords can be separated into two phases.
In the first phase, the airflow is passing the vocal cords which is considered to be a forced
vibration with constant force F0. After the airflow passed, in the second phase, the pressure
of airflow disappears which leaves the system to vibrate on its own and this is called free
vibration. In the forced vibration phase, after applying the Fourier transform to both side
of e.q. (4.1), we have,
F0
jω












where X(ω) is the spectrum of the vertical vibration signal and ω is the frequency. During
the horizontal propagation of the vibration signal from the vocal cords to the throat, the
vibration suffers from attenuation, and the corresponding model can be stated as follows,
xs(t) = x(t)e
−αd,
where xs(t) is the vertical displacement at the throat where the vibration has propagated,
x(t) is the vertical displacement at the vocal cords, d is the propagation distance, and α is




Note that α is related to the propagation medium. Wave propagation in the body is
dispersive by nature, which implies that different frequencies propagate with different
attenuation coefficients at different velocities. Roughly speaking, the attenuation is small
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when the vibration signal propagates through the hard bone, whereas the attenuation is
large through the soft tissue. Therefore, vibration waves generated at different positions at
throat result in different values of α and d, which make the vibration signals unique at
different positions. After putting all equations together, we obtain,
Xs(ω) =
(1− e−jωδt)e−αd







For the same location of the human body, m, c and k are stable and belong to the same
biometric feature. Each person’s lung volume and vocal cords are also different. Therefore,
the vibration at the throat of different people can uniquely be identified, which can be
leveraged for authentication. The propagation from the electronic device to the target
smartphone is different from that from the vocal organ through the human body. Thus,
this effect is also valuable for liveness detection.
4.3 Proof-of-Concept
We test the feasibility of MoVo and the results are shown from Fig. 4.4 to Fig. 4.7.
In each figure, we show both the raw signal and the spectrogram for the microphone data
and the motion sensor data. All data are collected by Google Nexus 6P. The audio data is
sampled at 8,000 Hz (telephone quality) while the motion data is sampled at 400 Hz as it is
the highest sampling rate on Nexus 6P.
Fig. 4.4, Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6, show the example data when the same user speaks the
same command “Ok Google”, different users speak the same command “Ok Google”, and
the same user speaks different commands “Ok Google” and “Hi Siri”, respectively. The data
are collected as in Fig 4.2c. In each figure, the top subfigure (a) is the raw microphone data;
the subfigure (b) contains the 3-axis accelerometers data and 3-axis gyroscopes data; the
subfigure (c) shows the frequency-domain information of raw audio data while the subfigure
(d) show that of raw motion data. In subfigure (d), we only choose acc-z data to draw since
it is the most representative one. The vertical red lines demonstrate the start and end points
of the sounding period.
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(a) Raw Audio Data.





































(b) Raw Motion Data.























(c) Spectrogram of Raw Audio Signals.






















(d) Spectrogram of Raw Motion Signals.
Figure 4.4: One user speaks “Ok Google” twice.
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(a) Raw Audio Data.





































(b) Raw Motion Data.






















(c) Spectrogram of Raw Audio Signals.

























(d) Spectrogram of Raw Motion Signals.
Figure 4.5: Different users both speak “Ok Google”.
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(a) Raw Audio Data.





































(b) Raw Motion Data.























(c) Spectrogram of Raw Audio Signals.

























(d) Spectrogram of Raw Motion Signals.
Figure 4.6: One user speaks “Ok Google” and “Hi Siri”.
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(a) Raw Audio Data.



































(b) Raw Motion Data.
























(c) Spectrogram of Raw Audio Signals.





















(d) Spectrogram of Raw Motion Signals.
Figure 4.7: Live user speaks “Ok Google” once, then replay the recording by an electronic
device.
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From these three figures, we can observe that the motion data are nosier and contain
much fewer data and less representative than audio data, which indicates the challenge
of designing MoVo. Fortunately, the results meet our expectations. Fig. 4.4 shows the
consistency when the same user speaks the same command and Fig. 4.5 shows the difference
when different users speak the same command. Such intra-class similarities and inter-class
differences indicate the feasibility of using motion data for user authentication. Moreover,
different users have similar raw audio spectrogram (Fig. 4.5c) but different raw motion
spectrogram (Fig. 4.5d), which is an evidence of different acoustic attenuation effect of
different people. Note that Fig. 4.5d shows the spectrograms are similar when one user
speaks different commands. Such observations indicate that frequency-domain data are not
of much use to match between motion data and the same commands. Therefore, we adopt
a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network, a variant of the Recurrent Neural Network
(RNN), to learn the patterns of motion data in time-domain.
Fig. 4.7 shows how MoVo can be spoof-proof. During the test, the user speaks “Ok
Google” once, and two smartphones (one is Google Nexus 6P and the other is iPhone XS
Max) record his voice. After the user finishes speaking, the iPhone XS Max replays the
recordings to Nexus 6P. The replay volume is set to be the maximum possible and the two
smartphones are physically contacted. The data in Fig. 4.7 are the readings from Nexus 6P,
which contains the live user’s voice followed by the iPhone replayed voice. We observe that
motion data for live person shows noticeable signals from 50 Hz to 200 Hz while motion data
for the electronic device shows only noises as in Fig. 4.7d, which is an evidence of that the
self demodulation effect of the human body generates more low-frequency signals (compared
to original sound signals, the frequency of 50-200 Hz signals are low). Note that there exists
a clicking noise at the time around 6.8 s, which is the time of clicking the button on the
iPhone to replay the voice. The iPhone is in close contact with the Nexus 6P, therefore the













Figure 4.8: Attack Model: There are three types of attack scenarios. To conduct a simple
playback attack, the target phone is placed in contact with the electronic speaker. To
conduct a mimicry attack, the target phone is placed on the attacker’s throat, but the
attacker will not speak during the authentication period. As for a sophisticated mimicry
attack, the attacker would try to mimic the victim’s voice while playing the victim’s sounds
through electronic speakers. In the two mimicry attacking scenarios, the target phone is
also in contact with the electronic speaker. In all three scenarios, the sound played by the
electronic speaker could be the pre-recorded sound from the legitimate user, synthesized
sound, or converted sound.
4.4 Attack Model
As mentioned in Section 4.1.2, traditional attacks to voice authentication are
impersonation attacks, replay attacks, speech synthesis attacks, and voice conversion
attacks. Real person impersonation attacks can be effectively defended by existing speaker
recognition algorithms in general. For the other three, attackers acquire the legitimate
user’s voice samples either in place or online. The attacker then processes the samples in
three ways to perform attacks: replay attack - concatenate voice segments to match the
legitimate user’s passphrase followed by harmful action or commands; speech synthesis -
build speaker model and synthesize passphrase from texts; voice conversion - the attacker
says the passphrase, then by spectral mapping and prosody conversion, the signals are
manipulated to sound like the legitimate user’s.
If the attacker directly plays the processed sound signals through the speaker, he is
conducting the simple playback attack, no matter the processed signals are pre-recorded
(replay attack), synthesized (speech synthesis), or converted (voice conversion).
A stronger attacker would perform the mimicry attack, where the processed signals
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are still played by electronic speakers, but the attacker also needs to place the smartphone
on his throat. In this case, the attacker can observe how the legitimate user passes the
authentication5 and try to mimic the throat movement of the legitimate user. Note that
we do not consider that the attacker uses the built-in speaker of the smartphone to play
the processed signal, because if the attacker can control the built-in speaker, he has already
hacked the targeted smartphone, which means there is no use to do voice authentication
anymore. Therefore, the speaker, shown as yellow icons in Fig. 4.8 must be a different
device from the smartphone.
The strongest attack is the sophisticated mimicry attack, where the attacker would not
only mimic the sound by the electronic device, but also by himself. Compared to the previous
case, the attacker would speak the same word along while the electronic speaker is playing.
Recall that impersonate the victim’s voice using vocal organs is very hard, the attacker
should either be professional impersonators or have natural voices similar to the victim’s.
Such a condition is hard to be met. Therefore, in this thesis, the sophisticated mimicry
attacker only controls the timing (starting or pausing when speaking), but not timbre.
Note that we consider two mimicry attacks because these two have different emphasis:
the mimicry attack makes sure the motion sensor data are affected by the victim’s sound,
while the sophisticated mimicry attack tries to add “liveness” to the motion sensor data.
4.5 System Design
4.5.1 System Overview
MoVo currently is a text-dependent voice authentication system. In other words, the
speaker recognition algorithm will work on hot-words such as “Ok Google”, “Hi Siri”, or
“Alexa”. When a user triggers the voice authentication system, the microphone works
normally and the motion sensors measure the modulated and attenuated sound signals at
the same time.
5MoVo is a spoof-proof voice authentication system and require users to place the phone on the throat. For
best user experience, it can downgrade to a normal voice authentication system and only process microphone
data for normal use. Only when the user accesses sensitive information or makes dangerous operation, the


























Figure 4.9: The flow of MoVo.
Since the hot-words are usually short, less than 2 seconds in our experiment, it is
acceptable to process the data together after the whole hot-word is spoken.
We first conduct the syllable separation on speech signals. For example, “Ok Google”
has 4 syllables in total: O-K-Goo-Gle, “Hi Siri” has 3, and “Alexa” has 3 too. We will,
later on, use the detected hot-word beginning and ending time, as well as the syllable nuclei
time to segment the accelerometer and gyroscope data. Since the motion data suffer from
noises from body movements, heartbeats, and breathings, we must preprocess the motion
data. We apply a high pass filter to mitigate the noises and increase the target signal.
We then segment the motion data based on different syllables. We focus on data
collected among the syllable nucleus. Because when the sound signal is the maximum, the
chance is high that the motion is also the maximum. The maximum motion indicates a
higher accuracy of the collected data, which is beneficial for training a more effective and
efficient classification model. Another benefit of the segmentation is that segmentation
provides the opportunity to do majority voting. For the motion data corresponding to
“Ok, Google”, as long as more than half of the samples are classified into the correct
category, we regard the speech and throat movement as matching each other. This greatly
increases the true positive rate of our liveness detection algorithm.
Due to the low sampling rate of motion sensors, the on-body vibration of speech cannot
be fully recorded in motion sensors. Finding good representative features is hard. Therefore,
we adopt the long short-term memory (LSTM) network, a variant of the recurrent neural
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a) Spectrogram of Filtered Speech Signals















b) Sound Intensity of Filtered Speech Signals
Silent Sounding Silent
Figure 4.10: Syllable Separation. The original signal is a female user saying “Ok Google”;
then the signal is filtered with a bandpass filter with passing frequency range [50 1000]. The
black dots in subfigure a) are the calculated pitches. The vertical red dotted lines indicate
the start and end of a sounding period. The blue vertical lines show the calculated time for
each syllable nucleus.
network (RNN), to help us learn the features on time-domain and classify each segment to
each syllable.
After the majority voting on the classification results on all data samples, MoVo outputs
whether the motion data match the live legitimate user’s training model. If yes, a live user
is asking the permission; otherwise, an attacker is using a speaker to attack the system.
4.5.2 Syllable Separation
A syllable is a unit of pronunciation having one vowel sound, with or without
surrounding consonants, forming the whole or a part of a word [89]. The vowel in the
middle of a syllable is referred to as a nucleus in phonetics and phonology. We modify the
syllable nuclei detection algorithm proposed by De and Wempe [26] and the detailed steps
are listed as the following:
Step 1. Before conducting the syllable separation, we first apply a [50− 1000] Hz
bandpass filter to remove noises so that the frequency range is speech-band limited. We
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then calculate the intensity and pitch to detect the syllable nucleus since the vowel within a
syllable has higher energy surrounding sounds.
Step 2. The intensity of a sound in air is the sound pressure level relative to 2 ∗ 10−5
Pascal, which is the normative auditory threshold for a 1000-Hz sine wave. We calculate the
intensity contour by squaring all values in the sound, then convolved with a Kaiser window.
To guarantee that a periodic signal is analyzed as having a pitch-synchronous intensity ripple
not greater than 0.00001 dB, we set the length of the Kaiser window to be 64 ms and the
sidelobe height to be -190 dB. In this way, we are able to find peaks in the energy contour
Step 3. We consider all peaks above a certain threshold in intensity to be potential
syllables. We set the threshold to 20dB below the maximum intensity measured over the
total sound file.
Step 4. We then use the intensity contour to make sure that the intensity between
the current peak and the preceding peak is sufficiently low. We consider only a peak with
a preceding dip of at least 2 dB with respect to the current peak as a potential syllable. In
this way, we also delete multiple peaks within one syllable.
Step 5. We use the algorithm proposed by Boersma {boersma1993accurate} to
calculate the pitch (fundamental frequency) contour of audio data. The window size is set
to be 100 ms with 20 ms time steps. We then exclude all peaks that are unvoiced. The
remaining peaks are considered syllable nuclei and will be used to segment motion data.
Fig. 4.10 shows the pitch contour in subfigure a) and the intensity contour in subfigure
b). The resulting appearance times of syllable nuclei are marked using blue vertical lines.
4.5.3 Preprocessing and Segmentation
The motion data is impeded by the low sampling rate, low target movement, and large
interference noises. To overcome such a problem, we must preprocess the motion data. We
apply a high pass filter to mitigate the noise and increase the signal-to-noise ratio. The
cutoff frequency is set to be 100 Hz, since noises such as breathing or walking or other
human movements can not create signals as high as 100 Hz. As shown in Fig. 4.11, after
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a) Spectrogram of Raw Motion Signals














b) Spectrogram of Processed Motion Signals














c) Motion Data Segementation
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Figure 4.11: Preprocessing and Segmentation.
applying a high pass filter, the motion data in Fig. 4.11b is much cleaner than the original
data in Fig. 4.11a.
We then use the syllable nuclei calculated in the previous section to segment the motion
data. As shown in Fig. 4.11c, we first calculate the half time points (green lines) from
sounding start time (red line), syllable times (blue lines), and sound end time (red line).
Then we extract each segmentation from two adjacent half time points (green lines). Note
that if the time duration between two adjacent half time points is large than 100 samples,
we will only keep the middle 100-samples data and discard the data at the beginning area
and the end area. This is because the data far from syllable nuclei are not as reliable as data
around syllable nuclei. Keeping those unreliable data does no good for the classification
model. Lastly, concatenating reliable data around syllable nuclei together gives the final
processed data. One example of the resulting segmentation is illustrated in Fig. 4.11d. Note
that Fig. 4.11c shows motion data of all six dimensions, while Fig. 4.11d only shows two of
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them: the data of the solid line is from the gyroscope and the data of the dashed line is from
the accelerometer.
Note that we do not consider the synchronization problem between the microphone and
the motion sensors. This is because the sampling rate of motion sensors is set to be 400Hz,
which means that an error with just one sample represents 1/400=0.0025 s. Within such a
period of time, the sound travels about 343 m/s * 0.0025 s ≈ 0.85 m in air, which is much
longer than the distance between the voice source and the microphone. In other words,
due to the low sampling rate of motion sensors, the true lag between microphone reading
and motion reading always falls in one sample period, which makes the synchronization
procedure unnecessary.
4.5.4 The LSTM Network
After the preprocessing and segmentation of the motion data, we use the data to
establish a sequence-to-sequence Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network model.
LSTM was first proposed by Sepp Hochreiter and Jürgen Schmidhuber in 1997 [45]. It is a
special variant of Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN), and is widely used in learning,
processing, and classifying sequential data because of its great property of selectively
remembering patterns for long durations of time. Over the years, there have also been
many variants of LSTM networks. However, based on a study in 2017, none of the variants
can improve upon the standard LSTM architecture significantly [38]. Therefore, we still
choose to implement the standard LSTM network in this work.
Our sequence-to-sequence LSTM has five layers in total and it is able to make different
predictions for each individual time step of the input data. In the sequence input layer, the
input data have 6 feature dimensions, which consists of 3 accelerometer dimensions and 3
gyroscope dimensions. Then we establish an LSTM layer formed by LSTM blocks, where
each block publishes its cell state to the next LSTM block. The output of the LSTM layer
is the fully connected hidden status layer. We set the total number of hidden units to be
100, then feed the hidden status to a softmax function and output the classification of each
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Figure 4.12: Classification result without syllable separation and majority voting: Falsely
classifying an ‘Ok Google’ sample to ‘Hi Siri’.



























Figure 4.13: Classification result from the sequence-to-sequence LSTM network. Although
many parts of the classification is incorrect, with majority voting, the final classification is
the correct ‘Ok Google’.
time step of input data.
4.6 Majority Voting
Since we are using the sequence-to-sequence LSTM network, an example classification
result is shown in Fig. 4.13. Though the ground truth of the test data is O-K-Goo-Gle, the
predicted result is O-Hi-O-K-O-Gle-O. However, with a majority voting algorithm, as long as
half of the sample falls in category ‘O’, ‘K’, ‘Goo’, and ‘Gle’, we will regard the whole input
data as in category ‘Ok Google’. The principle behind this majority voting is the consistency
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of the throat movement when speaking different syllables of one single command. In addition,
since the syllable segmentation algorithm is heuristic, its uncertainty in separating syllables
also increases the demand for adopting majority voting to compensate for the uncertainty.
In all, adopting syllable separation and majority voting can greatly increase the true positive
rate of MoVo.
Remark. In our experiment, we only train our model with 10 syllables since our system
is designed as a text-dependent voice authentication system. However, with a larger training
database, we can build a model with more syllables, and extend our system to work for text-
independent systems. According to [82], 322 syllables can form 5000 most frequent English
words. With such an extension, MoVo can also become a continuous voice authentication
system.
4.7 Implementation and Evaluation
Phones and Placements. We use Huawei Nexus 6P Android smartphone to collect
user data. Since we mainly use the microphone data to detect the syllable nuclei time, we
do not require a high sampling frequency of audio data. Indeed, we only record the data
at 8000 Hz (telephone quality). For the motion data, however, the sampling frequency is
the higher the better. The Nexus 6P is manufactured in 2015, but we have updated its
operating system to Android Orea (API level 26), which is released in 2017. By calling the
getMinDelay() function, we found the minimum delay allowed between two motion sensor
events is 2500 microsecond, which is a sampling frequency of 400 Hz. Therefore, we use 400
Hz for both gyroscope and accelerometer. As shown in Fig. 4.2, a smartphone user places
his device to his throat tightly so that conductive vibrations can be measured. The data
collection app is shown in 4.14a.
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(a) MoVo Data Collection
(b) Real Person Speaking
(c) Electronic Device Replaying Human Sounds
(d) No Human Sounds
Figure 4.14: Screenshots of the MoVo Data Collection App and MoVo Speaker Detection
App
Data Collection. Our experiment involves 20 participants aged from 20 to 35. Among
them, 13 are males and 7 are females; 15 are native English speakers and 5 uses English
as a second language. For each user, we ask them to speak the following three hot-words:
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“Ok Google”, “Hi Siri”, and “Alexa”. For each command, each user repeats it for 5 times.
Therefore, we have 300 command samples in total. When we train our LSTM network, we
are using the segmented motion data to train 10 different categories (‘O’, ‘K’, ‘Goo’, ‘Gle’,
‘Hi’, ‘Si’, ‘Ri’, ‘A’, ‘Le’, ‘Xa’). In this respect, we have 3000 sample sequences, where each
sequence is about 100 samples long.
(a) Smartphone (b) Laptop Speaker
(c) Desktop Speaker (d) Mimicry
Figure 4.15: Attacker Settings
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Attacks. As elaborated in Section 4.4, we evaluate our system against three types of
attack scenarios, simple playback attack, mimicry attack, and sophisticated mimicry
attack, where each scenario contains three kinds of attacks. Since speech synthesis and
voice conversion will generate speech signals similarly if use the same user’s speech profile.


































Accuracy: 90.43% Error Rate: 9.57%
Precision: 90.72% True Positive Rate (Sensitivity/Recall): 90.52%
F1 Score: 0.904 True Negative Rate (Specificity): 95.19%
False Negative Rate: 9.48% False Positive Rate: 4.81%
Figure 4.16: Success rate of MoVo on defending against various attacks.
In simple playback attacks, the recordings of the legitimate user are replayed by either
Logitech S120 2.0 Stereo Speakers, the built-in speakers of Apple Macbook Pro, and the
built-in speaks of an Apple iPhone XS Max. Each of the 20 participants is considered as a
legitimate user separately. For each participant, 5 attacks are conducted by the loudspeaker,
5 attacks are conducted by the laptop speaker, and 5 attacks are conducted by the iPhone
speaker. All three hot-words are tested. In total, there are 900 attacks. The attacking target
is always the Nexus 6P. The replay sound level is about 80dB, which is consistent with the
decibel level of normal human speech. The attacking device and the attacking target are
contacted, so conductive vibrations are measured. In mimicry attacks, two smartphones are
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placed together and attached to the human throat. In sophisticated mimicry attacks, we
consider 2 attackers: one male attacker to mimic the 13 male participants, and the other
female attacker to mimic the 7 female participants. The attacker holds the phone tightly to
his/her throat while replaying the target user’s voice commands as in the simple playback
attack cases. The sophisticated mimicry attack is repeated 5 times for each hot-word for
each participant. Again, there are 300 such attacks. The final results are shown in Fig. 4.16,
MoVo can defend replay attack with at least 90.43% accuracy.
We have also implemented an application on Android to run Ultra-Unlock in real-time.
As shown in Fig. 4.14, the MoVoApp will decide among the following three cases: 1) a real
human is speaking, 2) an electronic device is replaying human speeches, 3) no human sounds
are made. Currently, this app only serves as an liveness detection app. We plan to add the






































































(b) With Majority Voting
Accuracy: 93.67% Error Rate: 6.33%
Precision: 93.67% True Positive Rate (Sensitivity/Recall): 93.71%
F1 Score: 0.937 True Negative Rate (Specificity): 96.84%
False Negative Rate: 6.29% False Positive Rate: 3.16%
Figure 4.17: Confusion Matrix of Matching Motion Data to Different Hot-Words.
Results. Besides defending against various attacks, MoVo should accept legitimate
users as in normal voice authentication systems. In other words, MoVo should correctly
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Table 4.3: Statistical Analysis of the User Classification Result
Accuracy: 92.98% Error Rate: 7.02%
Precision: 93.33% True Positive Rate (Sensitivity/Recall): 94.58%
F1 Score: 0.924 True Negative Rate (Specificity): 99.64%
False Negative Rate: 5.42% False Positive Rate: 0.36%
classify a legitimate user’s motion data to the hot-words he says. As shown in Fig. 4.17,
the overall accuracy of correct classification is 93.67%. Note that we have two confusion
matrices. Figure 4.17a is the original results provided by the machine learning network,
while Figure 4.17b is the result with the presence of the majority voting procedure. There
is a significant accuracy improvement with the presence of majority voting. Therefore, we
only show the statistic evaluations of Figure 4.17b.






























Figure 4.18: Robustness of MoVo over time.
The results for user authentication are shown in Fig. 4.19 and Table. 4.3. Without
majority voting, the accuracy of user authentication is only 54.48%. With majority voting,
the accuracy increases to 92.98%. Note that this accuracy cannot beat existing speaker
recognition systems based on audio files. Therefore, for better security, this result can serve
as an extra channel of information.
We also test the robustness of MoVo in Fig. 4.18. We test both the one-time trained
model and the learning model which will use the accepted data as trained data for future
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authentication. Over 8 weeks, the learning model has a more stable performance.
4.8 Conclusion
Self demodulation and acoustic attenuation can be used to build MoVo, a spoof-proof
voice authentication system. When a user speaks with the smartphone placed on his throat,
his voice not only influences the microphone readings, but also affects the accelerometer and
gyroscopes. By adopting a sequence-to-sequence long short-term memory network, syllable
separation, and majority voting, MoVo can defend against 3 different types of attacks with


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(b) With Majority Voting
Figure 4.19: Confusion Matrix of Matching Motion Data to Different Users.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we studied three privacy and security problems on smartphones. We
first uncovered a new stealth attack named the Man-in-the-Phone attack that eavesdrops
on smartphones’ built-in speakers by the intra-device motion sensors. The attack is
implemented in Spy-Phone system utilizing speaker-independent machine learning, which
makes the attack more dangerous and harmful. We also provided hardware-based defenses
and software-based defenses for this attack, but this attack is still a threat for smartphone
users and requires user awareness. We then introduced two different authentication
methods. The Ultra-Unlock system enables users to unlock the smartphone with gestures
in the air. It is a good alternative to existing authentication methods. Moreover, the same
technique can be used for smartphone control, which allows users to unlock and control the
phone without touching the screen. The MoVo system is a patch for the current voice
authentication mechanism. It defends smartphones against various voice-spoofing attacks,
especially the replay attack. The three systems either propose new S&P problems on
smartphones, or solve existing S&P problems with novel approaches. However, we have
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